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THE ACTAVIS INFERENCE: THEORY AND PRACTICE
Aaron Edlin, Scott Hemphill, Herbert Hovenkamp & Carl Shapiro†
ABSTRACT
In FTC v. Actavis, Inc., the Supreme Court considered “reverse
payment” settlements of patent infringement litigation. In such a
settlement, a patentee pays the alleged infringer to settle, and the
alleged infringer agrees not to enter the market for a period of time. The
Court held that a reverse payment settlement violates antitrust law if
the patentee is paying to avoid competition. The core insight of Actavis is
the Actavis Inference: a large and otherwise unexplained payment,
combined with delayed entry, supports a reasonable inference of harm to
consumers from lessened competition.
This paper is an effort to assist courts and counsel in implementing
the Actavis Inference. First, we evaluate a variety of fact patterns that
have arisen in the district courts since Actavis, including payment that
takes a form other than cash. For example, a branded drug maker may
promise not to offer an authorized generic drug. As we explain, under
Actavis, such agreements are especially likely to violate antitrust law. We
also consider how much detail a plaintiff must offer in its initial
complaint to comply with federal pleading requirements.
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Second, we demonstrate that the Actavis Inference fully applies when
multiple generic firms, rather than just one, threaten to enter the
market. Our economic model shows that the Actavis Inference becomes
stronger and more important in the presence of multiple generic firms.
Our analysis demonstrates that the contrary conclusions reached in a
recent paper by Bruce Kobayashi, Joshua Wright, Douglas Ginsburg, and
Joanna Tsai (“KWGT”) are incorrect, inconsistent with KWGT’s own
analysis, or irrelevant to a faithful implementation of Actavis.
Third, we clarify the reasons not to litigate patents in antitrust cases.
Thanks to the Actavis Inference, a trial court need not determine patent
validity or infringement in order to assess the legality of the settlement.
The antitrust question depends upon the ex ante prospects in patent
litigation and not ex post litigation of the patent by a patent court or by
the antitrust court considering the settlement. Litigating the patent is
thus of limited probative value and not dispositive regarding a potential
antitrust violation.
I. INTRODUCTION
In FTC v. Actavis, Inc.,1 the Supreme Court considered the proper
antitrust treatment of a payment made by a patent owner to an alleged
infringer in settlement of their infringement litigation, wherein the
alleged infringer agrees not to enter the market until some date prior to
the expiration of the patent. The Court held that such “reverse payment”
settlements are illegal if the patent holder is paying to avoid
competition.2 Such settlements are fairly called “pay-for-delay”
settlements. The Court held, however, that not all reverse payment
settlements are presumed to be illegal, rejecting the FTC position,
because they do not all necessarily involve payment for delay. 3 The
question is when a court can reasonably infer that a reverse payment is a
payment for delay, or in other words, a payment to avoid competition.
While most settlements of patent infringement disputes raise no
antitrust issues, pay-for-delay settlements differ in important ways. In
most traditional settlements, the defendant pays the patentee a royalty
and produces under the patent. Production licenses are expressly
authorized by the Patent Act. Even production licenses that contain
limitations on the licensee’s output are lawful most of the time, even if
1. 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
2. Id. at 2236 (“[T]he payment (if otherwise unexplained) likely seeks to prevent the
risk of competition. And, as we have said, that consequence constitutes the relevant
anticompetitive harm.”).
3. Id. at 2237–38.
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made outside the litigation context. They are a form of technology
sharing that presumptively increases overall output. By contrast, a payfor-delay settlement does not involve a license at all, but at most a
promise to license at some future time. Pending that, it is simply a naked
market division agreement.
Secondly, in conventional patent litigation the plaintiff and defendant
are adverse on issues of validity, infringement, and remedy. The plaintiff
has a strong interest in having validity and infringement established,
while the defendant has a strong but opposite interest. By contrast, the
Hatch-Waxman Act’s provision forbidding entry by third firms until 180
days after the defendant (generic) produces—even when the defendant
chooses not to produce as part of the settlement—gives the parties a
strong joint incentive to use a settlement to delay the entry of follow-on
generic producers.4 The joint maximizing position for them is to preserve
patent exclusivity for as long as possible, but share the proceeds. The
only issue on which they have adversity is the size of the payment, which
is simply a wealth transfer between the two of them. The more likely the
patent is to be invalid or not infringed, all else equal, the larger that
payment will be.
According to Actavis, the trial court need not determine validity or
infringement of the patent in order to assess the legality of a reverse
payment settlement under the antitrust laws. 5 Unlawfulness requires a
reasonable inference of harm to consumers from lessened competition,
which can be established by identifying a large and otherwise
unexplained payment of cash or something else of value made by the
patent holder to the alleged infringer in exchange for that firm’s
agreement not to enter the market for some period of time. We call this
the Actavis Inference.
So far, these cases have arisen in the pharmaceutical industry, where
the patent holder (“Brand”) is selling a branded pharmaceutical product
and the alleged infringer (“Generic”) is planning to offer a bioequivalent
generic drug. In this context, the Actavis Inference enables the courts to
infer that a large, otherwise unexplained transfer of value from Brand to
4. In an ordinary patent case, if an alleged infringer agrees to leave a market or
delay entry as part of a patent settlement, other firms that think the patent weak may still
enter, potentially eliminating the gains from delay. In contrast, under the Hatch-Waxman
Act, the FDA will not approve a third party’s application to enter before 180 days
subsequent to the first generic beginning production. Id. at 2228–29. Third parties therefore
would find early entry much more difficult in the Hatch-Waxman context which greatly
increases the joint incentives of the brand and the first generic to agree to delay entry. Id.
5. Id. at 2236 (“It is normally not necessary to litigate patent validity to answer the
antitrust question . . . .”). In Part V, we explain that litigating the patent would, not in any
event, be dispositive regarding a potential antitrust violation and of limited probative value.
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Generic was made to delay generic entry.6 Part II below briefly sketches
out the logic behind the Actavis Inference and provides some background
for our subsequent analysis.
Shortly after the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Actavis, we
wrote a paper, Activating Actavis, designed to help the courts and counsel
implement the Actavis decision.7 We subsequently wrote a second paper,
Actavis and Error Costs, in response to critics of Activating Actavis.8 Now
we write again for three reasons.
First, the passage of time allows us to evaluate how district courts
have implemented the Actavis Inference and to make recommendations.
We continue to believe that the Actavis Inference is both important to
prevent anticompetitive settlements and workable in practice. We expect
it will take some time for the case law to become settled in this area,
since a wide variety of fact patterns arise and the Supreme Court left a
number of issues unresolved. Reverse payment settlements in which
Brand agrees not to offer a so-called “authorized generic” version of the
drug in question are of particular concern. As explained in Part III below,
under Actavis these agreements are especially likely to violate the
antitrust laws.
Second, we write to provide additional economic analysis that is
directly relevant to the Actavis Inference. More specifically, in Part IV we
present an economic model in which multiple generic firms, rather than
just one, are threatening to enter the market. 9 Many cases involve
multiple generic (potential) entrants, and the real bite of the HatchWaxman Act is its limitation on multiple entry, so we consider this
economic analysis important in practice. Our economic model shows that
the Actavis Inference becomes stronger and more important in the
presence of multiple generic firms rather than just one generic firm. More
precisely, we show that the incentive of the patent holder to pay the first
6. Under the burden shifting analysis applied in King Drug Co. of Florence v.
Cephalon, Inc., the plaintiff would have the burden to show that the payment was “large,”
but the burden would then shift to the defendant to show that it was not “unexplained.” No.
06-CV-1797, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9545, at *24 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 28, 2015). The court cited
the fact that evidence about the explanation is more likely to be in the hands of the
defendant. Id. Once the defendant has met this burden, the plaintiff could still show that
the defendant’s proffered justifications were pretextual or defeated by the existence of a less
restrictive alternative. Id. at *25.
7. Aaron Edlin, Scott Hemphill, Herbert Hovenkamp & Carl Shapiro, Activating
Actavis, ANTITRUST, Fall 2013, at 16 [hereinafter Activating Actavis].
8. Aaron Edlin, Scott Hemphill, Herbert Hovenkamp & Carl Shapiro, Actavis and
Error Costs: A Reply to Critics, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Oct. 2014, at 1 [hereinafter Actavis and
Error Costs].
9. The economic model in Activating Actavis included the patent holder and a single
alleged infringer.
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generic entrant to delay entry is greater if more generic entrants are
waiting in the wings. With multiple generic entrants, a large reverse
payment is even more likely to be made in exchange for limiting
competition, because competition is even more to be feared. This analysis
demonstrates that the contrary conclusions reached in a recent paper by
Bruce Kobayashi, Joshua Wright, Douglas Ginsburg, and Joanna Tsai
(“KWGT”)10 are incorrect, inconsistent with KWGT’s own analysis, or
irrelevant to a faithful implementation of Actavis.
Third, we clarify the reasons not to litigate patent validity in the
antitrust case. The Court in Actavis wrote, “[i]t is normally not necessary
to litigate patent validity to answer the antitrust question.” 11 In Part V,
we explain that the antitrust question depends upon the ex ante
prospects in patent litigation and not ex post litigation of the patent by a
patent court or by the antitrust court considering the settlement.
Litigating the patent would be of limited probative value and not
dispositive regarding a potential antitrust violation. This observation is
particularly important for those cases where the patent has been
adjudicated. A finding of invalidity or noninfringement, for example, does
not mean that a patent settlement is anticompetitive; conversely, a
finding of validity and infringement does not absolve the patent
settlement of anticompetitive effects.
II. THE ACTAVIS INFERENCE
Justice Breyer’s opinion in Actavis established the Actavis Inference.
Put simply, in the pharmaceutical context: if Brand pays more than its
prospective litigation costs to Generic, a firm threatening entry with a
generic version of the same drug; and if Generic agrees not to offer that
version for some period of time; then a fact-finder may properly infer that
such a “large and unexplained” 12 payment was made to delay generic
entry, and hence is anticompetitive.
One significant holding of Actavis is that a reverse payment
settlement can be unlawful even though it falls within the “scope of the
10. Bruce Kobayashi, Joshua Wright, Douglas Ginsburg & Joanna Tsai, Actavis and
Multiple ANDA Entrants: Beyond the Temporary Duopoly, ANTITRUST, Spring 2015, at 89
[hereinafter KWGT]. This article is an abridgement of a longer paper bearing the same title
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2508094 (Dec. 7, 2014) [hereinafter KWGT Working
Paper]. Beyond the specific reasons given in Part IV, the KWGT analysis is unhelpful as a
guide to courts or counsel because it offers a rejection and critique of the Court’s decision in
Actavis, rather than a faithful implementation of the Court’s instructions.
11. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2236 (2013).
12. Id.

590

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:585

patent.” In the particular case of reverse payment settlements involving
branded and generic drugs, the “scope” question usually refers to a
patent’s duration.13 A settlement is said to be within the patent’s scope if
it permits generic entry at some point prior to the patent’s expiration
date. The Court held that such agreements are to be assessed under
antitrust’s rule of reason. Within the rule of reason, anticompetitive
effect and market power can be inferred from the large payment itself, if
the payment was larger than the patent holder’s anticipated litigation
costs.14 That is the essence of the Actavis Inference.15
In Activating Actavis, we explained at length that the Actavis
Inference is strongly supported by economic analysis and consistent with
prior Supreme Court jurisprudence.16 In Actavis and Error Costs, we
further explained why the Actavis Inference is critical to avoid a
substantial risk of false negative results, i.e., situations in which
antitrust plaintiffs would otherwise be unable to challenge
anticompetitive settlements effectively.17
The Actavis Inference is important because Brand and Generic have
very strong incentives to agree to delay entry into the market by the
generic firm. Delayed entry by Generic preserves Brand’s monopoly.
Since monopoly profits are greater than the total profits if two or more
firms are competing, the two firms will maximize their combined profits
by delaying generic entry until the patent expires, provided antitrust
13. In general, conduct “outside the scope” of the patent can mean many things, from
the tying of unpatented goods to overly broad claim constructions or agreements requiring
the payment of royalties after a patent’s expiration. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Rule of
Reason and the Scope of the Patent, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. (forthcoming 2015); Michael A.
Carrier, Why the “Scope of the Patent” Test Cannot Solve the Drug Patent Settlement
Problem, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2012) (assessing the evolution of the test in the
context of reverse payment settlements, prior to its rejection by the Supreme Court).
14. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236–37; see also King Drug Co. of Florence v. Cephalon,
Inc., No. 06-CV-1797, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9545, at *23 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 28, 2015), which
followed this inference, rejecting the defendant’s argument that the size of the payment
must be assessed “in comparison to the brand manufacturer’s expected monopoly profits in
the absence of generic competition.” Id. at *56. Rather, the court followed the plaintiffs’
suggestion “that a reverse payment is sufficiently large if it exceeds saved litigation costs
and a reasonable jury could find that the payment was significant enough to induce a
generic challenger to abandon its patent claim.” Id. at *56–58. It then denied summary
judgment on evidence that the avoided litigation costs did not exceed $13 million but the
payment was much larger.
15. Defendants in one post-Actavis case have nevertheless argued that “delay”
requires a delay past the patent’s expiration. The district court correctly rejected that
argument. See United Food & Commercial Workers Local 1776 v. Teikoku Pharma USA,
Inc., No. 14-MD-02521, 2014 WL 6465235, at *8–11 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2014) (denying
motion to dismiss premised on mere fact of entry prior to patent expiration).
16. Activating Actavis, supra note 7.
17. Actavis and Error Costs, supra note 8.
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allows them to do so. Since generic entry greatly erodes the branded
firm’s profits, the incentives to enter into such an anticompetitive
agreement can be very strong. Such an agreement would deny consumers
any possibility of competition during the lifetime of the patent. The Court
emphasized that no matter how small the risk of invalidity or
noninfringement, a patent holder who pays to avoid that risk violates
antitrust law:
The owner of a particularly valuable patent might contend, of
course, that even a small risk of invalidity justifies a large
payment. But, be that as it may, the payment (if otherwise
unexplained) likely seeks to prevent the risk of competition. And,
as we have said, that consequence constitutes the relevant
anticompetitive harm.18
The Court identified a large and unexplained payment as a
suspicious act that suggests the patent holder is paying to limit
competition.
By contrast, the Actavis dissenters would have approved any
settlement within the scope of the patent.19 As they observed, such an
agreement would be no worse from consumers’ perspective than a
determination that the patent was valid and could be enforced for the
remainder of its term.20 Treating all settlements “within the scope of the
patent”21 as legal under the antitrust laws heavily favors antitrust
defendants, since the patent might have been found invalid or not
infringed if the patent case had been litigated. The dissent’s position
effectively presumes that Brand would have won its case with certainty.
But as we have argued, that conclusive presumption is inconsistent with
observing a large payment. If Brand knew for certain that it would win

18. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236. See also In re Aggrenox Antitrust Litig., No. 14-MD2516, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35634, at *44 (D. Conn. Mar. 23, 2015) (“Large reverse
payments that are not particularly large in relation to the value of the patent may show
confidence in the patent, but if they represent payment to avoid the risk of invalidation,
then they still run afoul of Actavis.”).
19. Id. at 2238 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that “a patent . . . provides an
exception to antitrust law, and the scope of the patent—i.e., the rights conferred by the
patent—forms the zone within which the patent holder may operate without facing
antitrust liability”).
20. This point assumes that the patent holder who wins the patent infringement case
would receive an injunction preventing the infringing firm from practicing the patent for
the remainder of its term.
21. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2238 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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the patent suit, there would be no reason for Brand to pay the alleged
infringer more than the Brand’s prospective litigation costs.
The Actavis Inference provides a relatively clear and direct route by
which an antitrust plaintiff can establish an inference that a reverse
payment settlement harms competition and thus violates the antitrust
laws. However, nothing in Actavis indicates that this is the only route an
antitrust plaintiff can take. Indeed, Actavis establishes that an antitrust
plaintiff challenging a patent settlement can prevail by showing that the
patent holder paid the alleged infringer to delay its entry into the market
and thereby restrict competition. In some cases this may be possible
without invoking the Actavis Inference, e.g., if there is other
contemporaneous evidence indicating that the purpose and effect of a
reverse payment was to delay entry. Actavis does not establish a safe
harbor for patent settlements involving reverse payments that are less
than litigation costs.
III. REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS IN THE DISTRICT COURTS SINCE
ACTAVIS
District courts have begun to address several distinct fact patterns
that have arisen in cases where reverse payments have been challenged
on antitrust grounds. In this Part, we address several of these fact
patterns. We continue to believe that the economic logic underlying the
Supreme Court’s Actavis decision, which forms the basis for the Actavis
Inference, is robust and flexible and can be applied in practice without
undue difficulty in a wide range of cases.

A. Cash vs. Noncash Payments
While the Court referred repeatedly in the Actavis decision to a
“cash” payment from the patent holder to the alleged infringer, the
economic logic articulated by the Court applies regardless of the
payment’s form. Restricting the Actavis Inference to payments made in
“cash” would open up a gaping loophole: the patent holder could purchase
corporate shares in General Motors, transfer the shares to the generic,
and evade Actavis because no cash changed hands. Furthermore, if forms
of payment that are less liquid or more difficult to value are exempt from
the Actavis Inference, settling firms will have an incentive to use those
forms of payment rather than cash, creating additional inefficiencies,
compounding the basic problem.
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We were therefore quite surprised when two district courts ruled
recently that the Actavis Inference only applies to “cash” payments. 22 In
the Lamictal case, the court stated that “the Supreme Court considered a
reverse payment to involve an exchange of money.” 23 The court then
rejected the Black’s Law Dictionary definition of “payment” as “the
delivery of money or some other valuable thing accepted in partial or full
discharge of an obligation.”24 The court even acknowledged that Chief
Justice Roberts’ dissent in Actavis repeatedly observed that the
majority’s logic must sweep in “other consideration” and “alternative
arrangements.”25 We expect that the appellate courts will reject such a
cramped interpretation of payment.26
At this writing, seven other district courts have explicitly addressed
this same issue, considering settlements on six drugs; these courts have
been more faithful to the logic in Actavis, finding that the form of the
reverse payment does not matter for the purposes of the Actavis
Inference.27 We urge other courts to follow this route.
As a practical matter, when the transfer of value from the patent
holder to the alleged infringer takes a form other than cash, some
22. In re Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust Litig., No. 1:13-MD-2472, 2014 WL 4368924, at *12
(D.R.I. Sept. 4, 2014) (concluding that payment must be in cash based on the “literal holding
of Actavis,” while noting the resulting “quandary” that under this interpretation, settling
parties “are likely to evade Sherman Act scrutiny”); In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser
Antitrust Litig., 18 F. Supp. 3d 560, 565 (D.N.J. 2014) (reading Actavis to require that the
settlement “must include money”).
23. Lamictal, 18 F. Supp. 3d at 568.
24. Id. (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1243 (9th ed. 2010)).
25. Id. (quoting Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2245 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)). The court then
found the contrary reasoning in other courts’ conclusions, as discussed below, to be
“unpersuasive.” Id. at 569.
26. At this writing, Lamictal has been argued and is pending before the Third Circuit,
and Loestrin is awaiting briefing in the First Circuit.
27. These district courts have analyzed settlements involving Aggrenox, Effexor XR,
Lipitor, Niaspan, Nexium (two courts), and Lidoderm. In re Aggrenox Antitrust Litig., No.
14-MD-2516, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35634, at *40–41 (D. Conn. Mar. 23, 2015); In re
Effexor XR Antitrust Litig., No. 11-CV-5479, 2014 WL 4988410, at *20 (D.N.J. Oct. 6, 2014)
(concluding that payments are not limited to cash, but that plaintiffs must provide a
reliable basis for assertions of non-cash payment); In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., No. 12-CV2389, 2013 WL 4780496, at *26 (D.N.J. Sept. 5, 2013) (“[N]othing in Actavis strictly requires
that the payment be in the form of money . . . .”); In re Niaspan Antitrust Litig., No. 13-MD2460, 2014 WL 4403848, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 5, 2014) (“[T]he term ‘reverse payment’ is
not limited to a cash payment.”); In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litig., 968 F. Supp.
2d 367, 392 (D. Mass. 2013) (“Nowhere in Actavis did the Supreme Court explicitly require
some sort of monetary transaction . . . .”); Time Ins. Co. v. Astrazeneca AB, No. 14-4149,
2014 WL 4933025, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 1, 2014) (Nexium) (“[R]everse payments deemed
anti-competitive pursuant to Actavis may take forms other than cash payments.”); United
Food & Commercial Workers Local 1776 v. Teikoku Pharma USA, Inc., No. 14-MD-02521,
2014 WL 6465235, at *11–12 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2014) (Lidoderm).
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additional analysis will be required to quantify the dollar value of the
reverse payment. This analysis is likely to depend heavily on the specific
facts of the case at hand and may well require a benchmarking exercise
that compares the case at hand to experience in similar markets.
Importantly, this analysis should be conducted from the perspective of
the patent holder. This follows from the economic logic underlying the
Actavis Inference: if the settlement involves the patent holder’s sacrifice
of something with greater value to it than its own prospective litigation
costs, it is reasonable to presume that the patent holder is paying for
some protection from competition.28
Therefore, for noncash reverse payments, the courts should seek to
measure the dollar value sacrificed by the patent holder as a result of the
agreement it reached with the alleged infringer.29 A pharmaceutical
example illustrates in general terms how this exercise is likely to play
out in court. Suppose the settlement involves Brand granting a license to
Generic to produce and market a second drug. Suppose further that
Brand will earn $100 million in royalties and Generic will make $25
million in economic profits under that license. Importantly, suppose there
is evidence from other licenses in the industry or from internal company
documents that if instead of licensing to Generic, Brand had made an
arms-length, stand-alone license for the second drug, Brand would expect
to earn $150 million in royalties while giving the licensee zero economic
profits.30 With this fact pattern, the settlement involves a $50 million
profit sacrifice by Brand,31 which is greater than the $25 million value of
the license to Generic.32

28. As we have noted in previous work, although a sacrifice by the patent holder is
the primary focus of the present analysis, a sacrifice is not the only route to establishing an
anticompetitive effect. See Activating Actavis, supra note 7, at n.22.
29. The same principle applies for reverse payments made in cash. For cash
payments, the profit sacrificed by the patent holder is simply the amount of the reverse
payment.
30. Economic profits are defined as profits in excess of a normal, risk-adjusted return
on capital. If several equally capable licensees compete vigorously to sign the license with
Brand for the second drug, their economic profits will be driven toward zero.
31. The $50 million profit sacrifice results from Brand earning $100 million rather
than $150 million in royalties.
32. In this example, the value of the license to Generic, $25 million, is less than the
profit sacrifice by Brand, which is $50 million. The example is purposefully designed so that
the combined profits of $125 million under Brand’s license with Generic are less than the
combined profits of $150 million earned under the arms-length, stand-alone license. This
“value destruction” will occur if (for example) Generic is not the best-qualified licensee for
the second drug. Here, using the less-capable Generic as the licensee for the second drug
results in a $25 million destruction in combined value, $125 million rather than $150
million. This is an example of the type of inefficiency that can result if companies use non-
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B. Promises Not to Offer an Authorized Generic Drug
A number of reverse payment settlements have involved promises on
the part of the branded pharmaceutical firm not to offer an authorized
generic (“AG”) version of the same drug. We now describe AGs and
explain how these agreements should be analyzed under the Actavis
decision.
1. Authorized Generic Drugs
An AG is a generic version of a drug, authorized by a branded drug
maker under its own FDA approval. The branded firm may market the
drug itself or, more commonly, contract with a generic drug maker to do
so. AGs have been an important feature of generic product launches since
the 2000s.33 Courts have consistently held that an AG may be marketed
even during the 180-day exclusivity period of an independent generic
drug maker provided for in certain circumstances under the HatchWaxman Act.34
There are several reasons why the supplier of the branded drug may
choose to introduce or enable an AG version. The AG will typically be
priced lower than the branded drug, which can enable the supplier of the
branded drug to engage in price discrimination. Such price
discrimination increases profits and might also increase output and
benefit consumers. This strategy is hardly unique to pharmaceuticals.
Firms commonly offer multiple products targeted at different market
segments, and they often use different brand names for high-end
products than for low-end products.
One should bear in mind that the branded product and the AG are
not independent rivals, even if they superficially appear to compete. In
cases where the firm selling the branded product introduces its own AG,
this is clear enough. But even in cases where the branded firm contracts
with a generic drug maker to market the AG product, that firm is not
truly an independent rival. Rather, it is dependent on the branded firm,

cash forms of payment in reverse-payment patent settlements in an attempt to avoid
antitrust liability.
33. FTC, AUTHORIZED GENERIC DRUGS: SHORT-TERM EFFECTS AND LONG-TERM
IMPACT 26–27 & fig.2–7 (2011) (analyzing generic launches with 180-day exclusivity for
branded drug administered as capsule or tablet, and finding that for fifty-five launches
between 2003 and 2008, 33, or 61 percent, included an AG).
34. Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. FDA, 454 F.3d 270, 271 (4th Cir. 2006); Teva Pharm. Indus.
v. FDA, 410 F.3d 51, 52 (D.C. Cir. 2005); see also Sanofi-Aventis v. Apotex, Inc., 659 F.3d
1171, 1174–75 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (taking this point for granted).
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which sets the quantity and pricing terms of the marketing arrangement
and may share in the profits.
Despite these qualifications, the presence of an authorized generic
version injects some additional competition into the market, above and
beyond that offered by the branded product and any generic products
supplied by other firms. From an antitrust perspective, this additional
competition can be especially significant if there would otherwise be only
one independent generic supplier.
2. No-Authorized-Generic Provisions
A promise by the branded pharmaceutical firm not to introduce or
permit an AG is generally referred to as a “no-AG” provision. A no-AG
provision is clearly costly to the branded pharmaceutical firm, since it
constrains that firm’s future business choices. No-AG provisions also are
clearly valuable to the independent generic firm. A no-AG provision is
especially valuable to a generic firm poised to enjoy the 180-day
exclusivity period.
As discussed in the previous subpart, two district courts have held
that Actavis is limited to cash. In both, the alleged noncash compensation
included a no-AG deal, which these courts therefore rejected as a basis
for the Actavis Inference.35 Five others have recognized that no-AG deals
are a form of payment.36 Yet another district court, while acknowledging
the above referenced evidence about output and price effects of
authorized generic entry in theory, nevertheless concluded that the value
of a branded firm’s promise not to enter the market was so “vague and
amorphous” that as pleaded, it could not be counted as a payment for
delay.37
This reaction is in sharp contrast to the concretely high value placed
on no-AG provisions by both branded and generic firms. Real-world
evidence of that value recently emerged in the first reverse payment trial
35. In re Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust Litig., No. 13-MD-2472, 2014 WL 4368924, at *12
(D.R.I. Sept. 4, 2014); In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., No. 12-CV-995, 2014
WL 282755, at *5 (D.N.J. Jan. 24, 2014).
36. The drugs are Aggrenox, Lidoderm, Niaspan, and Nexium (two district courts). In
re Aggrenox Antitrust Litig., No. 14-MD-2516, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35634, at *48–51 (D.
Conn. Mar. 23, 2015); United Food & Commercial Workers Local 1776 v. Teikoku Pharm.
USA, Inc., No. 14-MD-02521, 2014 WL 6465235, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2014)
(Lidoderm); In re Niaspan Antitrust Litig., No. 13-MD-2460, 2014 WL 4403848, at *11 (E.D.
Pa. Sept. 5, 2014); In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litig., 968 F. Supp. 2d 367, 392
(D. Mass. 2013); Time Ins. Co. v. Astrazeneca AB, No. 14-4149, 2014 WL 4933025, at *3–4
(E.D. Pa. Oct. 1, 2014) (Nexium) (agreeing with In re Nexium).
37. In re Effexor XR Antitrust Litig., No. 11-CV-5479, 2014 WL 4988410, at *21
(D.N.J. Oct. 6, 2014).
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after Actavis. At trial, purchasers and end-payors for Nexium, a
blockbuster heartburn drug, argued that AstraZeneca paid first-filer
Ranbaxy to delay entry by agreeing to a no-AG provision. In particular,
plaintiffs offered a short memorandum prepared by outside counsel
describing Ranbaxy’s anticipated bargaining position and AstraZeneca’s
strategy in response.38 The strategy centered on offering a no-AG
provision. As counsel candidly explained, “Ranbaxy likely will want a
settlement that preserves its 180-day period of exclusivity against other
generics and also guarantees that exclusivity against authorized generic
competition, and it may be willing to agree to a relatively late entry date
in a settlement that provides it with sole exclusivity.” 39
In any case where the plaintiff asserts that a no-AG provision
constitutes all or part of a large and unexplained reverse payment, the
plaintiff will need to present evidence allowing the court to reasonably
approximate how much money the branded firm sacrificed by agreeing
not to introduce or enable an AG version. Evidence regarding the profits
the branded firm expected to earn from an AG will be especially relevant
for this inquiry. Only rarely will it be possible to compute the value of a
no-AG provision with great precision, as one would with a strictly cash
payment. But it should often be possible to approximate that value under
reasonable economic assumptions. As a result, we believe that a no-AG
provision is a form of reverse payment whose value can be estimated and
made fully subject to the Actavis Inference.
More problematically, a no-AG provision places a second naked
market division agreement on top of the first agreement to delay generic
entry in exchange for a large payment. Nevertheless, courts thus far have
taken the view, albeit with little analysis, that no-AG agreements must
be assessed together with the rest of the deal under the rule of reason,
rather than viewing them as independently unlawful per se. 40 It bears
repeating that pay-for-delay settlements are not mere licenses over the
term of the delay, but horizontal agreements not to compete, and no-AG
provisions make a bad situation worse. In fact, the no-AG provision is
more harmful to competition than a cash settlement of the same
magnitude. The cash settlement operates as a mere wealth transfer from
the brand to the generic, delaying entry but with little impact on generic
38. Timothy Hester, Nexium Settlement Considerations (Aug. 3, 2007). The memo
was introduced at trial as Exhibit 140, and attached as Exhibit D to Motion for Permanent
Injunction, In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litigation, No. 12-MD-2409 (D. Mass.
Jan. 7, 2015) (No. 1457).
39. Id.
40. This is the case, explicitly or implicitly, with the district court opinions
considering no-AG deals discussed above.
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output once generic entry takes place. By contrast, the no-AG provision
compensates the independent generic in a more sinister fashion, by
giving it protection from competition that would otherwise occur and thus
keeping up prices at consumers’ expense. Worse yet, a legal rule that
permitted no-AG provisions while condemning large cash payments
would induce firms to choose the more harmful former alternative.
Nor can a no-AG provision be defended on the grounds that it is
nothing more than an exclusive license, which patent holders generally
have the statutory right to grant.41 That statutory argument might apply
if Brand’s no-AG commitment were combined with a patent license that
allowed Generic to enter the market immediately, but at the time the noAG provision is negotiated there is no marketing under a license at all,
but at most a promise to license at some time in the future. Clearly, the
Actavis Court did not believe that a pay-for-delay settlement was a
“license” authorized by the Patent Act, for it gave as one of its rationales
that this type of settlement was nowhere authorized by the patent
statute.42 Moreover, focusing on the legality of an exclusive license misses
the key issue, the fact of a transfer of value from Brand to Generic. As
one district court explained this point, “[i]f some particular transfer of
money would be unlawful—for whatever reason—its unlawfulness is not
cured merely because the value is transferred in the form of exclusive
licenses instead of cash, irrespective of whether the grant of an exclusive
license would otherwise be valid.”43
Summarizing, no-AG provisions are even more worrisome from an
antitrust perspective than are reverse payments made in cash. No-AG
provisions should be treated as a form of reverse payment, the magnitude
of which must be estimated on a case-by-case basis. The Actavis
Inference that a large and unexplained reverse payment is
anticompetitive should apply to sufficiently valuable no-AG provisions.

C. Pleading Issues
Pleading standards for pay-for-delay cases must meet the procedural
standards of the Supreme Court’s Twombly decision,44 which assesses
41. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2012) (patentee may grant an exclusive license).
42. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2233 (2013).
43. In re Aggrenox Antitrust Litig., No. 14-MD-2516, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35634, at
*49 (D. Conn. Mar. 23, 2015); see also id. (“The statutory authority to grant exclusive
licenses no more immunizes reverse-payment settlements that include them from antitrust
scrutiny under Actavis than the statutory authority to use cash as legal tender immunizes
reverse-payment settlements made in cash from such scrutiny.”).
44. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558, 570 (2007) (concluding that
complaint’s “factual allegations must be sufficient to raise a right to relief above the
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specificity requirements, and also the substantive standards of Actavis,
which require a “large” and “unexplained” payment in exchange for a
delay in entry. Here, we consider standards that plaintiffs must meet if
they intend to avail themselves of the Actavis Inference; we do not
address what applicable standards should be if the plaintiffs have
another plan to establish an anticompetitive payment for delay.
1. Products and Services Furnished by the Branded Firm
Often, the pleading issue arises in the context of noncash payments.
As discussed above, most courts agree that the payment need not be in
cash.45 They are also sensitive to the fact that noncash payments are
more difficult to evaluate than cash. This complication has presented
several issues at the pleading stage.
If the noncash payment consists of products or services, then the
associated cost to the branded firm (including the opportunity cost) must
be alleged and eventually proven. In one case involving the drug
Lidoderm, one component of value was easily alleged because the
agreement required the brand to give $12 million per month of the
branded product to the generic, thus stipulating the value of the noncash
payment.46 In any event, the court concluded, a noncash payment that
takes the form of product involves “a simple transfer of a fungible
product” and “calculating its value is straightforward.” 47 As a result, a
plaintiff who simply alleged the value of such a transfer survived
dismissal on this issue.48
2. Settlement of Unrelated Patent Litigation
In other cases the payment may be more difficult to value. For
example, if the payment takes the form of a settlement payment in
unrelated patent litigation that is far off of its reasonable market value,
then a plaintiff would have to place a value on that litigation in order to
speculative level,” which requires more than a “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully”); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
45. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
46. United Food & Commercial Workers Local 1776 v. Teikoku Pharm. USA, Inc., No.
14-MD-02521, 2014 WL 6465235, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2014).
47. Id.
48. See also King Drug Co. of Florence v. Cephalon, Inc., No. 06-CV-1797, 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 9545, at *63–69 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 28, 2015) (denying summary judgment, in case
involving alleged services provided by the generic, after crediting opinion of plaintiffs’
experts that the services were “unnecessary and unwanted”; not necessary for plaintiff to
show that the services were mispriced, provided that they created a reasonable inference
that they were paid for delay).
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plausibly allege that there was a payment for delay. 49 Importantly,
however, nothing in the standards for motions to dismiss prevent the
ordinary tools of statistical and economic analysis from being used to
estimate the value of the settlement of the litigation. This may require
inferences to be drawn from experiences in similar (benchmark) markets,
projections of market share or margins, and the like. Certainly, the
motion to dismiss standard should not require more than ordinary
summary judgment and trial rules require of expert testimony generally,
and may make use of the same tools.50
3. No-Authorized-Generic Deals
As discussed above, most courts have recognized that no-AG
provisions can constitute a payment for delay. 51 Placing a value on no-AG
agreements is more difficult than simply assessing a product price. To
employ the Actavis Inference in the context of no-AG agreements,
evaluation requires an estimate of the difference between branded profits
with and without authorized generic entry. As noted previously, however,
the parties negotiating these agreements appear to have little difficulty
placing a value on them. 52 The district court in the Lidoderm case found
it sufficient when a complaint cited an FTC study comparing market
shares and margins in response to independent generic entry where an
authorized generic was and was not present. The court concluded that
“[t]hese calculations are not overly complicated, and they are plausible.” 53
4. Size of Payment Compared with Avoided Litigation Costs
A further pleading issue, beyond the valuation of noncash payments,
arises in the context of avoided litigation costs. Although a few courts
have suggested the contrary, the Supreme Court does not require
evidence of a payment of a particular size. Actavis requires only a
payment in excess of the patentee’s reasonably anticipated avoided
49. Courts have confronted this issue in In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litig.,
No. 12-MD-02409, 2014 WL 4370333 (D. Mass. Sept. 4, 2014) (summary judgment); and In
re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., No. 12-CV-2389, 2013 WL 4780496, at *26 (D.N.J. Sept. 5, 2013)
(motion to dismiss).
50. See 2A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 397 (4th
ed. 2014).
51. See supra Part III.B.
52. See supra notes 45–47 and accompanying text.
53. United Food & Commercial Workers Local 1776 v. Teikoku Pharma USA, Inc.,
No. 14-MD-02521, 2014 WL 6465235, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2014) (citing and discussing
FDA,
Generic
Competition
and
Drug
Prices,
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/
CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDER/ucm129385.htm).
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litigation costs to trigger the Actavis Inference. The Actavis dissent
recited two estimates for litigation costs, ranging from $1.5 million per
side to $10 million per suit,54 which provide useful guidance. So a
plaintiff need not plead the precise or even a ballpark value of a no-AG or
other noncash agreement; rather, it must provide a sufficient basis for
believing that the cost to the branded firm exceeds that firm’s anticipated
litigation costs. A figure of $200 million would be sufficient, but so would
$20 million. We thus question one district court’s conclusion in Effexor
XR that “the non-monetary payment must be converted to a reliable
estimate of its monetary value so that it may be analyzed against the
Actavis factors.”55 Actavis never states that the value of the payment
must be ascertained, but only that it must be shown to be above
reasonably anticipated litigation costs to trigger the Actavis Inference. At
the same time, the Effexor XR court was disturbed by the fact that the
plaintiffs did not provide a basis for placing any value at all on the
arrangement. However, the court also suggested that simply citing the
Actavis dissent’s figures would have been sufficient.56
One important takeaway from these decisions is that those drafting
complaints should avail themselves of the enormous published literature
from the FTC and elsewhere placing a value on such things as litigation
costs, no-AG agreements, and other arrangements. While summary
judgment may require more particularized proof specific to the case,
citation of relevant, credible studies should be sufficient to satisfy the
Twombly pleading threshold.

D. Causation and Damages
Unlike the government enforcement agencies, private plaintiffs must
plead injury and indicate some reasonable basis for damages if they are
seeking them. For the plaintiff seeking an injunction, an allegation of
54. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2243–44 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
55. In re Effexor XR Antitrust Litig., No. 11-CV-5479, 2014 WL 4988410, at *20
(D.N.J. Oct. 6, 2014). The same district judge reached a similar conclusion in the Lipitor
litigation. In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., No. 12-CV-2389, 2013 WL 4780496, at *27 (D.N.J.
Sept. 5, 2013) (dismissing complaint for failure to estimate of value of settlements of
unrelated litigation alleged to be a payment for delay). For a contrary conclusion, see In re
Aggrenox Antitrust Litig., No. 14-MD-2516, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35634, at *47–48 (D.
Conn. Mar. 23, 2015) (“shar[ing] the concerns expressed” in Effexor XR and Lipitor, but
denying dismissal because “it is also clear that very precise and particularized estimates of
fair value and anticipated litigation costs may require evidence in the exclusive possession
of the defendants, as well as expert analysis, and that these issues are sufficiently factual to
require discovery.”).
56. In re Effexor, 2014 WL 4988410, at *22 (“[T]he Complaint could have alleged that
a reliable foundation is what is set forth in Actavis. . . .”).
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threatened harm is sufficient and should be satisfied by reasonable
allegations that the settlement agreement is unlawful and that entry was
delayed past the reasonably anticipated entry date. Indeed, to the extent
that the injunction seeks only prospective relief, a precise but-for entry
date need not be calculated at all. Once the settlement is found unlawful
the court may simply dissolve the agreement and open the way to
immediate entry.
If the plaintiff is seeking damages, however, calculating value is
likely to require establishing a but-for entry date, or estimate of the date
on which generic entry would have occurred had the pay-for-delay
settlement not intervened. In some cases the but-for entry date could be
almost immediately after the settlement. For example, the Lidoderm
district judge credited the argument (on a motion to dismiss) that the
generic would have been willing to risk entry immediately once it had
received a favorable ruling on claim construction of the patent in
question.57 In any event, estimating a but-for entry date is likely to be
easiest in cases where a court has already declared a patent invalid or
legal proceedings in a patent infringement suit have moved sufficiently
far along to warrant the conclusion that a reasonable generic would have
been willing to risk entry.
Causation issues also can arise if FDA approval has not yet occurred,
for reasons unrelated to the patent dispute itself. If the first-filing generic
had difficulties gaining FDA approval, the question naturally arises
whether the settlement was likely to delay generic entry. However, even
if the settling first-filing generic could not have entered earlier, due to
lack of FDA approval, the settlement may still have had an
anticompetitive effect, if the reverse-payment settlement delayed entry
by other generic firms. These issues arose in the Nexium case, where the
jury rejected causation on specific facts. 58

57. United Food, 2014 WL 6465235, at *15–16; see also King Drug Co. of Florence v.
Cephalon, Inc., No. 06-CV-1797, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9545, at *69–71 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 28,
2015) (plaintiffs created fact issue that generic would have entered at risk but for
settlement).
58. See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Permanent Injunction, In re
Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litigation, No. 12-MD-02409 (D. Mass. Jan. 7, 2015); cf.
In re Nexium Antitrust Litig., Nos. 14-1521, 14-1522, 2015 WL 265548, at *4 (1st Cir. Jan.
21, 2015) (approving, on divided panel, certification of class action even though expert’s
methodology for proving causation and harm might have included a few class members who
were not injured).
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E. Other Issues
Also important are collateral allegations that do not pertain directly
to the pay-for-delay sequence. While the Actavis Inference does not
require proof of patent invalidity or noninfringement, some cases directly
involve such claims. For example, some cases contain independent
allegations that the brand’s patent was obtained by inequitable conduct
or fraud, and that the improperly brought infringement suit was also
monopolization or an attempt to monopolize under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act.59
Today it is clear that consumers have standing to bring Walker
Process actions of this sort.60 Such a claim could yield damages quite
aside from the existence of any pay-for-delay settlement.61 In addition,
success on such a claim may provide evidence of a presumptive but-for
entry date. For example, suppose that a branded firm whose primary
patent expired in 2010 obtained a secondary patent lasting until 2020 but
the latter patent was fraudulently obtained and unenforceable. One
might readily conclude that one or more generic firms would have been
able to enter in 2010 upon the expiry of the original patent.
IV. THE ACTAVIS INFERENCE WITH MULTIPLE GENERIC ENTRANTS
In the Actavis decision, Justice Breyer opened his opinion by focusing
on a patent holder and a single alleged infringer: “Company A sues
59. See In re Effexor XR Antitrust Litig., No. 11-CV-5479, 2014 WL 4988410, at *26
(D.N.J. Oct. 6, 2014) (finding sufficient allegations of intent to commit fraud on the Patent
Office to withstand motion to dismiss); FTC v. Cephalon, Inc., 36 F. Supp. 3d 527, 534–36
(E.D. Pa. 2014) (concluding that patentee had committed fraud on the Patent Office prior to
entering settlement agreement); In re Lidoderm Antitrust Litig., 11 F. Supp. 3d 1344, 1345
(M.D.L. 2014) (noting assertion of sham litigation claim); King Drug Co. of Florence v.
Cephalon, Inc., Nos. 06-CV-1797, 06-CV-1833, 06-CV-2768, 08-CV-2141, 2014 WL 982848,
at *11 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 2014) (discussing Walker Process claim accompanying reverse
payment claim against parties to Provigil settlement); In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., No. 12CV-2389, 2013 WL 4780496, at *18–20 (D.N.J. Sept. 5, 2013) (noting allegations of Walker
Process fraud in obtaining patent).
60. Ritz Camera & Image, LLC v. SanDisk Corp., 700 F.3d 503, 508 (Fed. Cir. 2012);
In re DDAVP Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 585 F.3d 677, 690–91 (2d Cir. 2009). See
generally Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965)
(noting that patent infringement lawsuit based on fraudulently obtained patent could
constitute an antitrust violation).
61. For example, some decisions permit recovery of (trebled) litigation costs as
antitrust damages for Walker Process claims. See Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v. Nat’l Elec.
Contractors Ass’n, Inc., 814 F.2d 358, 373–74 (7th Cir. 1987); Kearney & Trecker Corp. v.
Cincinnati Milacron, Inc., 562 F.2d 365, 374 (6th Cir. 1977); 1 PHILLIP E. AREEDA &
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 205h (4th ed. 2013).
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Company B for patent infringement. The two companies settle under
terms that require (1) Company B, the claimed infringer, not to produce
the patented product until the patent’s term expires, and (2) Company A,
the patentee, to pay B many millions of dollars.” 62
Despite this crisp and abstract framing, which focuses on just two
firms, the Actavis case itself actually involved more than one generic
entrant, as Justice Breyer recognized.63 As a matter of law, the Actavis
Inference established by the Supreme Court clearly applies whether
there is one generic entrant or multiple generic entrants.
Many pharmaceutical reverse payment antitrust cases involve the
prospect of sequential entry by multiple generic suppliers. 64 Typically,
after the first-filing generic firm’s 180-day period of exclusivity ends,
additional generic firms enter the market before patent expiration.
Indeed, most of the drugs that are currently the subject of reverse
payment antitrust litigation have this feature. To illustrate, consider
seven drugs discussed in Part II.A, analyzed there in the context of
district court opinions that assessed alleged noncash payments for
delay.65 For five of the seven, additional generic entrants were waiting in
the wings following entry by the first filer. 66 For the remaining two drugs,

62. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2227 (2013).
63. Solvay, the manufacturer of AndroGel, faced multiple generic firms who had filed
ANDAs seeking entry before patent expiration. Actavis was first, and therefore enjoyed the
prospect of 180-day exclusivity. (At that time, the firm was called Watson. Watson later
acquired Actavis and changed its name to Actavis.) Paddock Laboratories also filed an
ANDA, and partnered with a third firm, Par Pharmaceuticals, to share the benefits and
costs of its challenge. As a later filer, Par/Paddock was stuck behind the Actavis exclusivity.
Id. at 2229. Solvay sued the generic firms, which litigated the dispute for several years. For
a description, see In re Androgel Antitrust Litig. II, 687 F. Supp. 2d 1371, 1374–75 (N.D.
Ga. 2010). During the course of litigation, the FDA approved the Actavis ANDA. Shortly
thereafter, Solvay entered the challenged settlements with Watson and Par/Paddock, with
alleged payments exceeding $170 million to Actavis and $72 million to Par/Paddock. See
Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2229 (describing payments to Actavis for nine years between $19 and
$30 million per year, $60 million to Par, and $12 million to Paddock).
64. Multiple entry can also occur without sequential entry. For example, for some
drugs, there are multiple first filers that settle for entry on the same day. The case of
multiple simultaneous entrants is in important respects similar to the monopoly/duopoly
case. We do not separately model that case here.
65. The drugs are Effexor XR, Lamictal, Lidoderm, Lipitor, Loestrin, Nexium, and
Niaspan. As to an eighth drug discussed in Part II.A, Aggrenox, the timing of multiple
generic entry cannot be assessed using public information.
66. Effexor XR: First-filer Teva secured a July 2010 entry date; sixteen later filers
were sued and settled, starting with IMPAX, which secured a June 2011 entry date. See In
re Effexor XR Antitrust Litig., No. 11-CV-5479, 2014 WL 4988410, at *11, *12 & n.13
(D.N.J. Oct. 6, 2014); Press Release, IMPAX Announces Final Settlement of Generic
EFFEXOR XR Patent Suit (July 16, 2008).
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the first filer’s settlement was set so late in the patent term that
additional generic entry before patent expiration was infeasible. 67
Lidoderm: First-filer Watson secured a September 2013 entry date. United Food &
Commercial Workers Local 1776 v. Teikoku Pharma USA, Inc., No. 14-MD-02521, 2014 WL
6465235, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2014). At least three additional generics—Mylan, Noven,
and TWI—filed Paragraph IV certifications and were sued. Mylan’s ANDA (#20–2346)
predated the Watson settlement. Mylan secured a consent judgment of noninfringement on
claim 1 of the single patent at suit. Consent Decree & Order, Endo Pharm. v. Mylan
Technologies, Inc., No. 11-CV-220 (D. Del. Oct. 4, 2013). As of December 2014, no additional
generic entrants have been approved due to unrelated FDA approval delays. See Mylan Q3
2014 Analyst Call (Oct. 30, 2014).
Lipitor: First-filer Ranbaxy secured a November 2011 entry date. Later filer Teva was
waiting in the wings to enter, but for Ranbaxy’s 180-day eligibility. See New York Attorney
General,
Assurance
of
Discontinuance
7
(Feb.
12,
2014),
http://www.ag.ny.gov/pdfs/AOD_Teva_Ranbaxy_Signed.pdf.
Nexium: First-filer Ranbaxy secured a May 2014 entry date. Later filer Teva secured
the same date in a second settlement. In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litig., 968 F.
Supp. 2d 367, 382–83 (D. Mass. 2013). The Teva date was, in practice, subject to a 180-delay
thanks to Ranbaxy’s exclusivity.
Niaspan: First-filer Barr (later acquired by Teva) secured a September 2013 entry date
and launched at that point. In re Niaspan Antitrust Litigation, No. 13-MD-2460, 2014 WL
4403848, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 5, 2014). Suits against Lupin and Sun, among others, were
filed and later dismissed. Lupin and Sun received approval in early 2014, shortly after
expiration of the 180 days.
Androgel, the drug considered in Actavis, is a further example. At the time of the
Androgel settlements, Actavis and Par/Paddock had agreed to staggered entry dates. See
Solvay Settles Dispute with Par, Watson, Associated Press, Sept. 13, 2006 (noting August
2015 entry for Actavis, February 2016 entry for Par/Paddock); Brief in Opposition of
Par/Paddock at App. 4a ¶ 6, Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223 [hereinafter Brief in Opposition]
(providing in settlement agreement for entry in February 2016 provided that Actavis
entered with exclusivity in August 2015). Later, Actavis voluntarily relinquished its
entitlement to the 180 days. Brief in Opposition at 10; see also In re Androgel Antitrust
Litig. II, 687 F. Supp. 2d at 1377. As a consequence, Actavis and Par/Paddock ended up
with the same entry date. See Second Amended Complaint for Injunctive and Other
Equitable Relief ¶ 65, FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., No. 09-CV-00955 (N.D. Ga. May 28,
2009) (alleging August 2015 entry date for both Actavis and Par/Paddock); Actavis, 133 S.
Ct. at 2229 (“The other generic manufacturers made roughly similar promises.”).
67. For Lamictal and Loestrin, the first filer’s entry date was six months prior to
patent expiration, and the first filer anticipated launching with exclusivity, leaving other
generics with the prospect of waiting until patent expiration.
Lamictal: First-filer Teva secured a July 2008 entry date, six months prior to patent
expiration (as extended by pediatric exclusivity). In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust
Litig., 18 F. Supp. 3d 560, 561 (D.N.J. 2014); see also Letter from Gary Buehler, Dir. of
Office of Generic Drugs, FDA, to Philip Erickson, Teva Pharms. USA (Aug. 30, 2006)
(approving ANDA 76-388 with exclusivity).
Loestrin: First-filer Watson secured a January 2014 entry date, six months prior to
patent expiration. In re Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust Litig., No. 13-MD-2472, 2014 WL 4368924,
at *4 (D.R.I. Sept. 4, 2014). Later filer Lupin was sued and settled for entry “around the
same time” as patent expiration. Id. at *5. Watson subsequently forfeited its exclusivity for
failing to receive tentative approval within thirty months. Letter from Robert West, Dep.
Dir. of Office of Generic Drugs, FDA, to Janie M. Gwinn, Watson Labs., Inc. FDA (Sept. 1,
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Because multiple generic entry is so common, as courts apply the
Actavis Inference, it is important to understand how the economic logic
underpinning the Actavis Inference works in cases with more than one
generic entrant.
In Activating Actavis, we developed and explained the economic logic
behind the Actavis Inference by describing the incentive of a patent
holder to pay a single potential entrant to delay its entry into the market.
Our economic model analyzed the case in which entry would convert a
monopoly into a duopoly, i.e., the case of a single generic entrant. Here
we extend our economic model to include multiple generic entrants.
Reflecting the 180-day exclusivity period rewarded to the first generic
firm under the Hatch-Waxman Act, our model contemplates sequential
entry: initially one generic firm enters, followed later by more.
Common sense and intuition suggest that the Actavis Inference is
even more important with multiple generic entrants than with just one
generic entrant. With multiple generic entrants, delaying generic entry
will boost profits even more, and harm competition even more, than with
just one generic entrant. As a result, pay-for-delay settlements are even
more tempting for the settling parties and even more harmful to
consumers.
We show here that common sense and intuition are firmly supported
by cold economic logic and formal economic modeling. Along the way, we
show that the challenge to the Actavis Inference made by Kobayashi,
Wright, Ginsburg, and Tsai in their recent paper is flawed on multiple
grounds. KWGT criticize the Supreme Court’s decision in Actavis as well
as challenging the economic basis for the Actavis Inference that the
Court established. Much of what KWGT recommend is of no help to
courts, since KWGT elaborate arguments made by the Actavis dissent but
rejected by the Court. Other claims by KWGT are incorrect or contradict
KWGT’s own economic analysis.

A. Sequential Generic Entry Under the Hatch-Waxman Act
The Hatch-Waxman Act’s provision of 180-day exclusivity to a firstfiling generic firm creates an important mechanism for staggered entry
by multiple generics.68 In many instances, additional generics are blocked
2009) (approving ANDA 78-267). According to plaintiffs, its settlement guaranteed the 180
days by contract (to the extent within control of the parties). Direct Purchaser Consolidated
Amended Complaint at 41–42, Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust Litig., No. 13-2472 (D.R.I. Dec. 6,
2013).
68. In this paper, we assume basic familiarity with this and other features of the
Hatch-Waxman Act. The Actavis decision itself provides a brief overview of the relevant
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from the market until 180 days after the first generic’s entry.69 Due to
this provision in the Hatch-Waxman Act, a settlement between a branded
pharmaceutical firm and the first-filing generic firm effectively
immunizes even a very weak patent from challenge for the period covered
by the delayed entry agreement plus 180 days.
Settlement has a further consequence in the case of multiple
entrants. A fully litigated declaration of patent invalidity would estop the
branded firm from asserting its patent against other generics, so after
180 days other generics would be able to enter the market as well. 70 This
prospect of entry by a second (or third) generic makes it even more
valuable to the branded firm to enter into a pay-for-delay settlement with
the first-filing generic, because drug prices, and hence the branded firm’s
profits, fall further in response to subsequent generic entry than they do
in response to the first generic entrant. 71

B. Economic Analysis with Subsequent Generic Entrants
In Appendix A, we present two formal economic models in which
Brand and Generic negotiate to settle their patent litigation. These
models extend our earlier monopoly-duopoly model to include subsequent
generic entry.
In both models, if the parties do not settle, then following litigation,
we assume that if the Generic prevails in the patent litigation, additional
generic firms enter the market 180 days after Generic enters.72 The
models differ in the case of settlement. A settlement specifies the date at
which Generic can enter the market and the size of a payment from
provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act. For a more thorough discussion of the operation of the
180-day exclusivity period, see C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent
Settlement as a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553 (2006).
69. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2012). The Supreme Court described the process
in Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2228.
70. See Blonder-Tongue v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 330–34 (1971) (holding
that a patentee whose patent is found invalid in fully and fairly litigated decision is
collaterally estopped from claiming validity against a subsequent infringement defendant).
71. See C. Scott Hemphill & Mark A. Lemley, Earning Exclusivity: Generic Drug
Incentives and the Hatch-Waxman Act, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 947, 953–54 (2011) (collecting
evidence); FTC, PAY-FOR-DELAY: HOW DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS COST CONSUMERS
BILLIONS 8 (2010) (concluding that based on public information about drug launches that in
a “mature” generic market, one year after the first generic enters, generic penetration is 90
percent and generic prices are 15 percent of the pre-entry branded price). In our model in
Appendix A, this effect is captured by the term. Our model also reveals an additional benefit
to the branded firm from settlement that is not present in the model with only a single
generic entrant. This additional incentive, captured by the term, is independent of the
agreed-upon entry date of the generic firm.
72. If Brand wins the litigation, we assume no generic entry takes place.

608

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:585

Brand to Generic. In the first model, which we call our “180-day duopoly”
model, in the case of a settlement, we assume that additional generic
firms enter the market 180 days after Generic enters the market, even if
this time occurs before patent expiration. In our second model, the
“durable duopoly” model, there is no multiple entry until patent
expiration—that is, the settlement might result in a durable duopoly.
(Durable duopoly is the case studied by KWGT.)
We prove four main results, which hold in both models of multiple
generics.
Proposition #1 says that the combined incentive of Brand and Generic
to settle to restrict competition is greater with multiple generic entrants
than for a single generic entrant. Put differently, the additional combined
profits (compared with litigation) from the settlement that maximizes
profits without any antitrust limits are greater in the presence of
multiple generic entrants.
Proposition #2 says that if the settlement involves a payment greater
than Brand’s prospective litigation costs, the settlement reduces the
period of time during which consumers benefit from competition
involving multiple generic firms.73
Proposition #3 says that relaxing the Actavis Inference by allowing
payments greater than litigation costs would harm consumers and reduce
total welfare.
These three propositions together provide strong economic support
for the Actavis Inference in the presence of multiple generic entrants.
Proposition #1 warns us that antitrust limits are needed—even more
with multiple generic entrants—to protect consumers from settlements
that would otherwise prevent generic entry for some or all of the
remaining lifetime of the patent.
Proposition #2 implies that antitrust appropriately comes into play if
the payment is greater than litigation costs. Such settlements restrict
competition by shortening the period of multiple generic competition
compared to litigation. Such settlements are therefore anticompetitive
under the logic of the Actavis opinion, as they prevent competition or
eliminate the risk of competition.
Settlements violate Sherman Act §1 if they restrict competition and
injure consumers. Given restriction of competition is found in Proposition
#2, the remaining question is what the benchmark of comparison is for
consumer welfare by which to judge injury to consumers. Under the
73. This reduction is relative to the expected period of multiple-generic competition
under litigation. Such a payment also signals that the patent holder had doubts about
whether the patent would be found valid and infringed if litigated.
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Actavis opinion consumers are injured if the settlement leads to lower
welfare than under either of the following two benchmarks:74
Benchmark #1. The welfare that consumers could expect from
completing the litigation.
Benchmark #2. The welfare that consumers could achieve in an
alternative settlement that did not have a large payment, i.e., a
payment exceeding the plaintiff’s prospective litigation cost. 75
The second benchmark is an application of the less restrictive
alternatives test.76 Lower payments will come with earlier entry dates (in
equilibrium) and are less restrictive of competition.
Proposition #3 tells us that a less stringent rule than the Actavis
Inference, such as an inference only triggered by even larger payments,
would be worse for consumers. Furthermore, relaxing the Actavis
Inference is a bad idea even if one uses the more forgiving total welfare
standard rather than the consumer welfare standard embraced by the
Supreme Court.
A corollary of Proposition #3 is that if we observe the parties
bargaining to a settlement involving a reverse payment in excess of
prospective litigation costs, then this settlement has lower consumer and
total welfare than any alternative settlement that they would actually
reach if they were constrained to a payment equal to or less than these
litigation costs. Thus any settlement with a large payment injures
consumers using Benchmark #2 and it therefore violates the antitrust
laws.
Injuring consumers compared with Benchmark #1 is not required to
violate the antitrust laws, given that consumers are injured with respect
to a reasonable alternative settlement under Benchmark #2. Nonetheless
it is still worth investigating if settlements with large payments will
74. See Actavis and Error Costs, supra note 8, at 4. The Court’s opinion supports this
approach. See id.
75. The alternative settlement used in Benchmark #2 should be one that the parties
would likely reach if the parties were constrained to lower reverse payments.
76. On the importance of less restrictive alternatives in antitrust litigation under the
rule of reason, see 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1505
(3d ed. 2010); C. Scott Hemphill, Less Restrictive Alternatives in Antitrust and
Constitutional Law (working paper 2015); see also King Drug Co. of Florence v. Cephalon,
Inc., No. 06-CV-1797, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9545, at *44, *53–54, *62 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 28,
2015) (identifying and applying the rule, drawn from standard rule of reason principles,
that plaintiff has opportunity to demonstrate that defendants’ conduct was not necessary to
achieve the asserted pro-competitive objective).
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injure consumers relative to Benchmark #1. We believe that they
typically will, but we have been able to construct a theoretical
counterexample in which consumers are better off than with Benchmark
#1. Our counterexample requires some rather extreme assumptions: (1)
Brand has no bargaining power; (2) Brand gets nearly the entire market
during the duopoly period; and (3) There is no increase in quantity
between duopoly and free entry.
Our final proposition asserts that typically a settlement with a large
reverse payment will also injure consumers compared with Benchmark
#1. More specifically: Propositions #4a and #4b say that settlements with
payments larger than litigation costs reduce consumer welfare, relative
to litigation, under the conditions that apply in practice.77
The basic intuition underlying our four propositions is the same as in
the monopoly-duopoly model. A payment larger than litigation costs
raises the question: why is the brand paying so much? In the monopolyduopoly model, the answer is that Brand is paying to avoid or eliminate
duopoly competition. In the multiple generic model, the answer is that
Brand is paying to avoid or eliminate competition from multiple generics.
Our analysis further reveals the danger that certain anticompetitive
reverse payment settlements will not be caught using the Actavis
Inference. This danger is not unique to the case of multiple generic
entrants but occurs because the Actavis Inference, by construction, is
favorable to antitrust defendants. The reason has to do with the
bargaining dynamics of a branded drug maker.
The point is most easily seen in the basic monopoly-duopoly model. If
Generic has all the bargaining power—that is, it retains all of the joint
gains from settlement—and Brand has none, then a payment that equals
litigation cost involves no payment for delay. Because Brand has no
bargaining power, the most Brand can get from the settlement is what it
could expect from litigation, so the agreed entry date under the
settlement equals the expected entry date under litigation. Because
Brand has the option to litigate, this is also the least that Brand will
accept. Thus, if there are ten years left on the patent and Brand has a
90% chance of winning the lawsuit, it will pay an amount equal to its
litigation cost and allow entry at nine years, which equals 90% of ten
years. There is no payment for delay in such a settlement. If the
settlement involved a payment from Brand to Generic greater than
litigation cost, Brand would require some delay in competition beyond the
nine years. Hence, payments in excess of litigation cost involve payment
for delay.
77. See infra Appendix A.
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Suppose instead that Brand has significant bargaining power, as is
likely in practice. In such a case, even a payment just equal to litigation
cost would involve a payment for delay. The reason is that while the
earliest entry date acceptable to Brand is nine years, given a payment
equal to Brand’s litigation cost, the latest entry date acceptable to
Generic will be something more than nine years—slightly more than 9.2
years in an example discussed by KWGT. 78 This difference in acceptable
entry dates represents a bargaining range. If Brand and Generic split the
difference, a version of equal bargaining power, they will agree to an
entry date in between—slightly more than 9.1 years. This implies that
even though the payment just equals Brand’s prospective litigation cost,
part of the payment is compensation for a delay of 0.1 years. It follows
that payments somewhat less than litigation cost also involve some
payment for delay.79
This example illustrates that the Actavis Inference is not sufficiently
aggressive to eliminate all anticompetitive settlements. In this context,
the Inference essentially assumes that Brand has no bargaining power.
This supports our view that antitrust plaintiffs should and do have the
ability to challenge reverse payment patent settlements without relying
on the Inference.
This analysis does not mean that the Actavis Inference is ineffective.
What the Inference accomplishes is to identify and deter the worst
anticompetitive settlements. It prevents Brand and Generic from
choosing settlements with later entry dates and larger payments—from
moving out along the “Ray of Delay,” in the terminology of our earlier
paper80—thereby injuring consumers by reducing competition.
In the context of multiple generic entry, the effects are more complex
because multiple entry broadens the bargaining range, compared to the
monopoly-duopoly model. (KWGT also observe an expansion of the
bargaining range.81) We speak of a settlement being “minimally
acceptable” to Brand (respectively Generic) if it yields Brand (Generic)
profits at least as high as expected under litigation. For any given level of
payment, the possibility of multiple entry means that Brand would find
earlier entry minimally acceptable, compared to the monopoly-duopoly
model. Generic would likewise find later entry minimally acceptable.

78. See KWGT, supra note 10, at 91 fig.2.
79. See also Hemphill, supra note 68, at 1594–95 (identifying an allocative harm from
settlement, where payment is less than Brand’s avoided litigation cost, if Brand has
significant bargaining power).
80. Actavis and Error Costs, supra note 8, at 6.
81. KWGT, supra note 10, at 89.
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If Brand has no bargaining power, it is constrained to enter into a
minimally acceptable settlement. Thus, compared to the monopolyduopoly model, it will accept an earlier date for the first generic entrant.
Even with zero Brand bargaining power, all the results discussed above,
regarding lost competition, reduced welfare, and the bad consequences of
a relaxation of the Actavis Inference, fully apply. Indeed, such
anticompetitive settlements may occur even in the face of the Inference
with relatively low payments at or below prospective litigation cost. In
this further respect, the Inference is insufficiently stringent to identify all
anticompetitive settlements. However, the higher the reverse payments
the more anticompetitive the settlements will be, holding bargaining
power and other factors constant.
If Brand has bargaining power, settlements at any given level of
payment are worse for consumers than if Brand has no power. The
results above all still apply when the Brand has bargaining power and in
some respects are strengthened. With a payment equal to litigation cost,
a Brand with substantial bargaining power will insist upon a delay
(compared to litigation) in the entry of all generics, including the firm it
is settling with. For this reason, when Brand has substantial bargaining
power, consumer welfare and total welfare will surely become lower in
settlement than in litigation even when the inequality conditions of
Propositions #4 and #4a are not satisfied. The anticompetitive potential
of settlements is exacerbated by the presence of multiple generics when
Brand has bargaining power, because Generic’s minimally acceptable
settlement is later than in a duopoly-monopoly model, and Brand’s
bargaining power pushes Generic closer to its minimally acceptable
settlement.82

C. Critique of Paper by Kobayashi, Wright, Ginsburg, and Tsai
KWGT state that in Actavis the Court infers “that reverse payments
greater than anticipated litigation costs are likely to harm competition”
and that “[t]he single-entrant models provide analytical support for the
Court’s inference.”83 We agree. Where we part ways is in multiple entrant
models (incidentally the actual setting of Actavis). In such cases, KWGT
believe that the legal rule of Actavis—the Actavis Inference—is not well
supported by economic analysis. Their conclusion contains three claims:

82. For related arguments, see Einer Elhauge & Alex Krueger, Solving the Patent
Settlement Puzzle, 91 TEX. L. REV. 283, 314 (2012); Hemphill, supra note 68, at 1588–94.
83. KWGT, supra note 10, at 90.
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The analysis in this article, which incorporates a model that allows
for multiple entrants under Hatch-Waxman, shows such a rule
will deem some welfare increasing settlements anticompetitive,
encourage litigants to use other, potentially more inefficient means
to settle, and increase the costs of dynamic Type I errors. 84
We show below that each of these three claims is either incorrect,
inconsistent with KWGT’s own model, or irrelevant to a faithful
implementation of the Court’s opinion in Actavis.85
KWGT’s own economic analysis confirms that in the absence of
antitrust limits (or under the Actavis dissenters’ scope of the patent test),
Brand and Generic will have the mutual incentive to agree to delay
Generic’s entry into the market until the expiration of the patent,
denying consumers any chance of enjoying the benefits of generic
competition until the patent expires. This is exactly the incentive of the
parties to move out the Ray of Delay that we described in Actavis and
Error Costs.86 This incentive is illustrated by some early pay-for-delay
settlements reached before parties became wary of antitrust liability, 87
and also by some more recent settlements. 88 Furthermore, KWGT’s own
economic model supports a more stringent approach to reverse payment
settlements than provided by the Actavis Inference. As a result, there is a
striking internal contradiction between the results found in KWGT’s
economic model and their policy conclusions.
As a preface for what follows, we note that all of the economic
examples used by KWGT in their article are special cases of the durable
duopoly model presented in Appendix A to this article. As a result, the
three propositions discussed above and proven in Appendix A with
respect to both of our models, also apply to all of KWGT’s numerical
examples. We now discuss KWGT’s three claims.

84. Id. at 95.
85. Our statements below should be understood to be made in the context of the
KWGT examples and that of the models in our Appendix. As a result, some statements are
starker than we would necessarily make outside the context of these economic models.
86. Actavis and Error Costs, supra note 8, at 6.
87. See, e.g., In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514,
519–20 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
88. For example, the Lamictal and Loestrin settlements discussed above feature entry
only in the last six months of the patent term, leaving just enough space for the first-filing
generic to exercise exclusivity before patent expiration. For other drugs, the settlement date
is timed to correspond to the effective end of the drug product’s life due to efforts to switch
patients to a new drug prior to generic entry.
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KWGT Claim #1: The Actavis Inference “will deem some
welfare increasing settlements anticompetitive.”
Is Claim #1 a problem for the Actavis Inference? KWGT certainly
suggest as much, but as we now show, it is not.
If Claim #1 is referring to consumer welfare,89 the standard used by
the Actavis Court, then the claim flatly contradicts one of KWGT’s own
findings. In particular, when KWGT analyze the case of reverse
payments with multiple generic entrants, 90 they conclude: “Therefore, all
feasible settlements, including those in which there is no reverse
payment, generate consumer welfare that is lower than the expected
welfare net of litigation costs that would be produced through
litigation.”91
Regardless of whether Claim #1 refers to total welfare or consumer
welfare, Claim #1 does not undermine the Actavis Inference. What does it
mean that the Actavis Inference “will deem some welfare increasing
settlements anticompetitive”? At most, it means that some feasible
welfare increasing hypothetical settlements are banned by the Actavis
Inference.92 But, the question is not whether feasible settlements that
would improve welfare are prevented by the Actavis Inference. The
question is whether desirable settlements that would actually be chosen
in equilibrium are prevented by the Actavis Inference. The distinction
between feasible outcomes and actual equilibrium outcomes is fundamental to neoclassical economic analysis, yet KWGT fail to make this
distinction when they state their conclusion.93 This error is fatal to their
critique of the Actavis Inference.94
89. See KWGT, supra note 10, at 90 (asserting that a litigation cost benchmark would
not “encourage settlements that would increase consumer welfare”); see also Joshua D.
Wright, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Antitrust Analysis of Reverse Payment Settlements
After Actavis: Three Questions and Proposed Answers (Oct. 10, 2014) (on file with authors)
(making a closely related claim by reference to consumer welfare).
90. KWGT, supra note 10, at 91–93.
91. Id. at 93. Based on this statement, the KWGT analysis actually justifies a
stronger version of the Actavis Inference, one that would apply to reverse payments smaller
than litigation costs.
92. We follow KWGT here and refer to settlements that are preferred to litigation by
both Brand and Generic as “feasible” settlements. In the economics literature, including the
literature on bargaining and negotiations, this concept is referred to as “individually
rational.”
93. In Actavis and Error Costs, we made a similar critique of a recent paper by
Harris, Murphy, Willig and Wright, who make a similar point to KWGT’s. See Barry C.
Harris, Kevin M. Murphy, Robert D. Willig & Matthew B. Wright, Activating Actavis: A
More Complete Story, ANTITRUST, Spring 2014, at 83 [hereinafter HMWW]. Both HMWW
and KWGT are premised on an expansion of the parties’ settlement range, and both criticize
the Actavis Inference for banning hypothetical settlements that would not actually be
equilibrium settlements if the Actavis Inference were abandoned. The odd thing about
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Propositions #2 and #3 show that when the reverse payment exceeds
the Brand’s prospective litigation costs, then the settlement is
anticompetitive under Benchmark #2 in Actavis. Moreover, Proposition
#3 shows that if the Actavis Inference were weakened, or eliminated,
then the parties would choose settlements with lower consumer and total
welfare in our models, and hence in the KWGT model as well. 95 The
reason is that allowing a larger reverse payment leads to an equilibrium
settlement with later generic entry, which harms consumers and reduces
total welfare; in the limit if all reverse payments are allowed, then the
equilibrium settlement will delay competition until the patent expires.96
Thus, once we properly restrict attention to equilibrium settlements, it
becomes clear that the presence of multiple generic entrants does not
provide a reason to weaken or eliminate the Actavis Inference, regardless
of whether consumer welfare or total welfare is the antitrust goal.
KWGT Claim #2: The Actavis Inference will “encourage
litigants to use other, potentially more
inefficient means to settle.”
This claim is a bare assertion, which makes its first appearance in
the final sentence of the KWGT paper. The KWGT economic model does
not analyze or mention “inefficient means to settle,” and we are unable to
find any arguments or facts in the KWGT paper that address this point
or support this claim. Nonetheless, we pause to address this concern.
If the Actavis Inference applied only to cash settlements, as a few
district courts have mistakenly held (see Part III above), then Brand and
Generic would indeed be tempted to use noncash payments to transfer
KWGT making this mistake is that they do distinguish between feasible and equilibrium
settlements in much of their analysis, yet they fail to do so in their policy conclusions.
94. By contrast, our model does not support the conclusion that all feasible
settlements reduce consumer welfare.
95. These propositions therefore refute KWGT’s claim that “using litigation cost as an
indicator of an anticompetitive settlement would [not] . . . encourage settlements that would
increase consumer welfare.” KWGT, supra note 10, at 90. Abandoning the Actavis Inference
would lead to equilibrium settlements with lower consumer welfare and total welfare than
ones that would obtain under the Actavis Inference.
96. In fact KWGT state exactly this fact about equilibrium settlements in the course
of their analysis: “If there are no legal constraints upon settlement, then the multiple entry
model predicts a set of equilibrium settlements that do not allow early entry and in which
reverse payments X are 1.5 to more than 18 times the Brand’s litigation costs.” KWGT
Working Paper, supra note 10, at 12. All such settlements reduce consumer and total
welfare with respect to both Benchmark #1 and Benchmark #2. In their conclusions,
however, KWGT focus on feasible and not equilibrium settlements and suggest that it is
lamentable that the Actavis Inference does not permit some hypothetically desirable
settlements even though these settlements would not arise in equilibrium if the Actavis
Inference were abandoned.
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value from Brand to Generic. Certainly these noncash means of
transferring value could be inefficient. For example, Brand might issue a
license to produce another drug on very favorable terms to Generic, even
though Generic is not the most capable firm to make and sell that drug.
The inefficiencies caused by these noncash transfers of value could well
compound the anticompetitive inefficiencies, identified in Propositions #2
and #3, associated with large and unexplained cash payments.
The obvious way to avoid encouraging firms to “use other, potentially
more inefficient means to settle” is to apply the Actavis Inference to all
forms of consideration, not just cash, as we have explained here and
previously. Here again, the economic analysis warns against a cramped
or narrow interpretation of the Actavis Inference, the opposite of what
KWGT advocate.
KWGT Claim #3: The Actavis Inference will “increase the
costs of dynamic Type I [false condemnation] errors.”
This claim, like the first claim, is flatly inconsistent with KWGT’s
own economic analysis. As we noted above, in their model of multiple
generic entry, KWGT conclude that “all feasible settlements, including
those in which there is no reverse payment, generate consumer welfare
that is lower than the expected welfare net of litigation costs that would
be produced through litigation.”97 This statement implies that the Actavis
Inference cannot lead to any false antitrust condemnations in their model
according to their own analysis. Since all feasible settlements harm
consumers, any settlement prevented by the Actavis Inference also would
have harmed consumers. Stopping such a settlement is not an error, but
rather the correct outcome under antitrust law, under the consumer
welfare standard employed by the Actavis Court.
Furthermore, we have shown that KWGT’s Claim #3 is false in our
more general economic model. Our Propositions #2 and #3 establishes
that in our models (and thus in the KWGT model) the Actavis Inference
will not generate any false antitrust condemnations. In the models, any
settlement with a reverse payment in excess of litigation cost is indeed
anticompetitive. Brand will only pay more than its litigation cost if doing
so reduces the period of time during which consumers benefit from
competition by multiple generic firms. In addition, our Proposition #3
shows that weakening the Actavis Inference would lead to outcomes that
are worse for consumers.

97. KWGT, supra note 10, at 93.
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V. THE ROLE OF PATENT VALIDITY AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR THE ACTAVIS
INFERENCE
We now discuss the role of determinations of patent validity (or
infringement98) in the antitrust assessment of the legality of reverse
payment settlements. The Supreme Court clearly stated that “it is
normally not necessary to litigate patent validity to answer the antitrust
question.”99 Nonetheless, trial courts handling these antitrust cases will
continue to be faced with evidence and arguments regarding patent
validity or invalidity. Perhaps the starkest instances arise in antitrust
cases where, subsequent to the reverse-payment settlement in question,
but prior to the resolution of the antitrust case, the relevant patent is
litigated and found to be either valid or invalid. For example, in the Cipro
case, the patent was subsequently found valid, 100 and in the Provigil case
the patent was later found invalid.101 A second situation arises if the
antitrust court is asked to relitigate the patent case to assess its likely
outcome, an unappetizing task disparaged as “turducken” by one court of
appeals.102
Our main message here is straightforward: the correct antitrust
analysis must be based on what was reasonably known to the parties
about patent validity and infringement at the time they entered into their
settlement. Stated differently, the antitrust analysis of a reverse-payment
settlement should be made on an ex ante basis, as of the date of the
settlement itself. A subsequent finding of patent invalidity does not imply
that there was an antitrust violation, regardless of the presence or size of
a reverse payment. Nor does a subsequent finding of patent infringement
imply there was no antitrust violation despite a large and unexplained
reverse payment.103

98. Our analysis in this Part generally applies to noninfringement, but we focus on
validity for simplicity.
99. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236.
100. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 188, 197
(E.D.N.Y. 2003) (reporting unsuccessful post-settlement challenges to the patent including,
inter alia, Bayer AG v. Schein Pharm., Inc., 301 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
101. Apotex, Inc. v. Cephalon, Inc., No. 06-CV-2768, 2011 WL 6090696 (E.D. Pa.
2011), aff’d, 500 F. App’x 959 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (holding patent invalid and unenforceable, by
same judge considering antitrust challenges to the settlement); see also In re Tamoxifen
Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 193 (2d Cir. 2005) (discussing instance where patent
was invalidated by district court before settlement).
102. FTC v. Watson Pharm. Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1315 (11th Cir. 2012), rev’d on other
grounds, Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
103. In Appendix B, we develop this point further, presenting an error-cost analysis
of the Actavis Inference. As explained there, KWGT’s error-cost analysis is fundamentally

618

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:585

The Supreme Court adopted an ex ante approach in Actavis, which
held that settling by paying to avoid the risk of competition, i.e., the risk
of losing the patent case, is an antitrust violation. 104 That risk is assessed
at the time of the settlement; it would make no sense to evaluate such
“risk” after the patent has been found valid or invalid. The very notion of
“risk” here is an ex ante concept.
The best information the antitrust court has regarding the parties’ ex
ante beliefs about patent validity and infringement is likely to come from
the terms of the agreement they reached.105 A large and unexplained
payment is a strong signal that the patent holder had substantial doubts
that it would win the underlying patent litigation. As put by the Court:
“In a word, the size of the unexplained reverse payment can provide a
workable surrogate for a patent’s weakness, all without forcing a court to
conduct a detailed exploration of the validity of the patent itself.” 106
Moreover, as we noted in Activating Actavis, even a reliable
determination that a patentee was likely to win its patent case does not
answer the liability question, since a patentee may make a large
payment to eliminate even a small probability of losing its case. 107
To illustrate why the antitrust analysis of patent settlements must be
done on an ex ante basis, consider a garden variety patent license in
which Firm A licenses its patent to its sole rival, Firm B. Under this
license, Firm B pays running royalties to Firm A based on the number of
units Firm B produces. The patent license raises Firm B’s marginal costs
and thus raises the prices charged by both firms to consumers. Suppose
that Firm A’s patent is subsequently found to be invalid. Unquestionably,
the patent license led to higher prices, which harmed consumers.
Unquestionably, Firm A derived benefits from a patent that was later
found invalid. Yet it would be a mistake to conclude that the patent
license violated antitrust law. To do so would open up most patent
licenses to subsequent antitrust challenge, a highly undesirable outcome
flawed, since it starts from an incorrect notion of what constitute Type I and Type II errors
in the antitrust assessment of a patent settlement.
104. The Court wrote that settling “to prevent the risk of competition” is “the
relevant anti-competitive harm.” Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236. The European Court of Justice
has also adopted an ex ante approach, writing that “the anti-competitive nature of
[AstraZeneca’s] acts must be evaluated at the time those acts were committed.”
AstraZeneca v. Commission, Case C-45710 P, December 6, 2012.
105. Information about patent strength known to the parties at the time of
settlement, such as a prior judicial determination of validity or internal analyses identifying
the weakness of the patent, might be a useful additional source of inference for the factfinder in cases where the facts evincing payment are ambiguous.
106. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236–37.
107. Activating Actavis, supra note 7, at 19.
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and one that is obviously contrary to antitrust law. 108 The only exception
would be one where the patentee knew from the onset that the patent
was invalid.109
The antitrust analysis of this garden variety license is done on an ex
ante basis, based on the information available to Firm A and Firm B
when they signed the license. Presumably, Firm B only agreed to pay
running royalties to Firm A because Firm B believed there was some
chance that Firm A would win if Firm A sued Firm B for patent
infringement. Indeed, we would expect the negotiated royalty rate to
reflect the strength of Firm A’s patent. There is no basis to believe that
Firm B paid “too high” a running royalty rate, and thus no basis to
believe that the license harmed consumers. A subsequent determination
that the patent is invalid does not change the proper, ex ante, antitrust
analysis of the license. This same principle applies to reverse-payment
settlements evaluated using the Actavis Inference.
There is an important lesson here for courts. The “turducken”
approach of litigating the patent is not just costly, but largely beside the
point when determining whether a reverse payment settlement violates
the antitrust laws. The antitrust question has to do with whether
competition was likely to have been reduced by the settlement, based on
the information available to the parties at the time they settled their
patent litigation. Relying instead on subsequent patent validity findings
carries a heavy risk of hindsight bias.
VI. CONCLUSION
We believe that our discussion has made several propositions clear.
First, nothing in either the Actavis decision or common sense
indicates that noncash payments should be immunized from the Actavis
Inference. To immunize such payments would completely undermine the
Supreme Court’s ruling. To be sure, noncash payments might sometimes
be more difficult to evaluate, but federal judges have considerable
experience in placing value on goods or services other than cash.
Second, no-authorized-generic provisions are a noncash form of value
transfer that should count just as much as cash in determining the
existence of a payment for delay. Indeed, to the extent that a no-AG
provision differs from a cash payment, it is more anticompetitive. The
108. See Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1306–07 (11th Cir.
2003) (pay-for-delay settlement not unlawful per se simply because patent in question was
subsequently found invalid: “We hold that the mere subsequent invalidity of the patent does
not render the patent irrelevant to the appropriate antitrust analysis.”).
109. Id. at 1307–09.
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cash payment is simply a wealth transfer from the brand to the generic,
while the no-AG provision operates as an additional anticompetitive
market division.
Third, the Actavis Inference is at least as important when there are
multiple generic entrants than when there is just a single generic
entrant. This comports with common sense, and we have established this
conclusion in a suitable economic model.
Fourth, litigating the patent is not only costly and unnecessary for
the antitrust case, but largely beside the point and carries with it a
substantial risk of hindsight bias. A large reverse payment is a surer sign
of antitrust violation than a finding of patent invalidity. And, a finding of
patent validity should not immunize the parties from antitrust violation.
Finally, our analysis indicates that the Actavis Inference is not the
only way for a plaintiff to prove its case. The Actavis Inference will fail to
capture some anticompetitive pay-for-delay agreements with payments
less than anticipated litigation costs. This indicates that plaintiffs should
be given the opportunity to establish through other means that a patent
settlement is anticompetitive even if the Actavis Inference does not
apply.
This conclusion is consistent the Actavis decision. Nothing in the
decision immunizes from antitrust scrutiny settlements involving
payment less than anticipated litigation costs. An antitrust challenge to
such a settlement could succeed, without the benefit of the Actavis
Inference, if the antitrust plaintiff is able to establish through other
means that the settlement led to a delay in generic entry, and thus is
anticompetitive. In other words, the Actavis decision did not create a safe
harbor for settlements involving reverse payments smaller than
anticipated litigation costs.

APPENDIX A: ECONOMIC MODEL WITH MULTIPLE
GENERIC ENTRANTS
We denote the Brand by B and the Generic, a first ANDA filer, by G.
The remaining patent lifetime is T. For simplicity, we assume no time
discounting. Brand places a probability P on winning the patent
litigation, i.e., that the patent will be found valid and infringed. Both
Brand and Generic are assumed to be risk neutral. The exclusivity period
for the first ANDA filer is denoted by H (for half-year). Generic receives
this exclusivity period if it litigates and wins, or if it settles.
Monopoly profits for Brand are denoted by
. Duopoly profits for
Brand are denoted by
Profits for Brand following multiple generic
entry, which we refer to as “free entry,” are denoted by
Duopoly
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profits for Generic are
Profits for Generic following multiple generic
entry are denoted by
All profit and consumer surplus measures are
flows per unit time. We assume that the combined profits of Brand and
Generic are higher under monopoly than duopoly, and higher under
duopoly than under free entry:
.
Consumer surplus is higher under free entry,
, than under
duopoly,
, and higher under duopoly than under monopoly,
, i.e.,
. Total welfare, i.e., profits plus consumer surplus, is higher
under free entry than under duopoly, and higher under duopoly than
under monopoly.
Brand and Generic can settle or litigate. Litigation costs for Brand
and Generic are
and
. A settlement involves two parameters: the
entry date E for Generic and a reverse payment X made by Brand to
Generic.110 Since we are interested in the impact of allowing for multiple
generic entry, we look at settlements that leave sufficient time for
multiple generic entry to occur. This requires that
. If
there is no time prior to patent expiration for entry by other generics,
so the monopoly-duopoly model and analysis apply.
SETTLEMENT

WITH MULTIPLE GENERIC ENTRANTS: 180-DAY

DUOPOLY
In this section we present and analyze our 180-day duopoly model of
multiple generic entry in which we assume that Generic receives the
exclusivity period H following a settlement, with additional generic firms
entering the market after that exclusivity period ends. In practice, in
many or even most cases, the assumption that further generic entry will
occur following a settlement and the 180-day exclusivity period is
empirically correct. For example, in five of the seven drugs with pay-fordelay litigation discussed in Part IV, there were additional entrants
poised to enter, prior to patent expiration, following the expiration of the
180 days. In the remaining two, the first filer’s entry date was 180 days
prior to patent expiration, and no additional pre-expiration entry was
possible.
This is not the assumption made by KWGT. They assume instead
that there is no additional generic entry prior to patent expiration
following a settlement, even if there is time left on the patent for such
entry to occur after the end of the 180 days. Instead, they assume there is

110 The reverse payment X in our model should be interpreted as net of any
consideration flowing from Generic to Brand. In the language of Actavis, X - CB is the
“unexplained” payment from Brand to Generic.
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durable duopoly. We consider that situation in our durable duopoly model
subsequently.
Table 1 gives the expected time spent in monopoly, duopoly, and free
entry during the patent period under litigation and under the settlement
in the 180-day duopoly model.
Table 1: 180-day
Duopoly Model
Monopoly
Duopoly
Free entry

Expected Period of Time
Litigation
PT
(1-P) H
T - PT - (1 - P)H =
(1-P)(T - H)

Settlement
E
H
T-E-H

Combined Profits from Eliminating Competition
If Brand and Generic bargain efficiently without any antitrust
constraints other than the scope-of-the-patent test, they will select E to
maximize their combined profits, with X determining how those profits
are split between Brand and Generic. This implies that
, so generic
entry does not occur prior to the expiration of the patent. This yields
combined profits of
. Litigating yields combined profits of:

PTM B + (1- P)H(DB + DG ) + (1- P)(T - H )(FB + FG ) - CB - CG .
The additional profits available from settling and preventing generic
entry for the lifetime of the patent are the difference between these two
expressions, which is equal to

(1- P)T (M B - DB - DG ) + (1- P)(T - H )(DB + DG - FB - FG ) + CB + CG .
The first term represents the extra profits from monopoly rather than
duopoly, in the event that the patent does not hold up in litigation. The
second term reflects the extra profits from duopoly rather than free entry,
after the 180-day exclusivity period ends, in the event that the patent
does not hold up in litigation. The final two terms are the savings on
litigation costs from settling. The first term is unchanged from the
monopoly to duopoly model. The second term only arises with multiple
generic entrants, which lowers the profits to Brand and Generic in
comparison with duopoly. Since this term is positive, we have:
Proposition #1: The incentives of Brand and Generic to enter into an
anticompetitive settlement delaying generic entry are greater with
multiple generic entrants than with one generic entrant.

2015]

THE ACTAVIS INFERENCE

623

Brand Payoff from Settlement vs. Litigation
Brand’s payoff from settling on terms [E, X ] is

EM B + HDB + (T - E - H)FB - X . Brand’s expected payoff from
litigating is PTM B + (1- P)[HDB + (T - H)FB ]- CB . If we observe a
settlement, we may reasonably infer that it was better for Brand than
litigating, so we can infer that

EM B + HDB + (T - E - H)FB - X > PTM B + (1- P)[HDB + (T - H)FB ]- CB .
Simplifying, this inequality can be written as
.

(1)

The first term on the left-hand side represents the expected value to
Brand of delaying entry. The expected length of the delay is
and
the value to Brand of delay is
. This is the value of delay because
a later entry date does not affect the length H of the duopoly period. As
shown in Table 1, later entry prolongs the initial monopoly phase and
shrinks the final, free-entry phase.
The second term of the left-hand side represents an additional value
to Brand of settling. So far as we are aware, this effect has not previously
been identified. Under settlement, Brand will surely benefit from the
partial protection associated with duopoly rather than free entry. This
protection has value H (DB - FB ) . Under litigation, Brand will only

receive this partial protection if it loses the patent litigation. In expected
value terms, this partial protection is worth (1- P)H(DB - FB ) .
Settlement gives an additional value equal to the difference between
these two terms, namely PH(DB - FB ) .111
The right-hand side,
settlement vs. litigation.

X - CB , is the extra out-of-pocket cost of

111. Another way to understand this non-intuitive term is to ask how increasing the
exclusivity period, H, affects Brand’s incentive to settle. If Brand settles, longer exclusivity
is valuable to Brand for sure. However, if Brand settles, longer exclusivity is valuable to
Brand only if it loses the litigation. Increasing H thus tilts Brand toward settling.
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Comparison with Monopoly to Duopoly Model
In our previous model, there was no additional entry following the
exclusivity period, so FB = DB . Making this substitution, the inequality
above becomes

(E - PT )( M B - DB ) > X - CB .

The prospect of multiple generic entry increases the benefit to Brand
of a settlement that delays entry, for two reasons. First, delaying entry
gives Brand extra profits of (E - PT )(M B - FB ) , which is greater than

(E - PT )(M B - DB ) . This reflects the additional harm to competition

associated with delayed entry in the case of multiple generic entry.
Second, settlement allows Brand to receive duopoly protection with
certainty rather than just when it loses the patent litigation. This
produces an extra settlement value of PH (DB - FB ) . Note that this
value is independent of the entry date E.

Actavis Inference with Multiple Generic Entrants: Large Payments
Imply Less Competition from Multiple Generic Entrants
We now show that the Brand will only be willing to make a reverse
payment in excess of its prospective litigation cost if the settlement
results in less competition (in expectation) from multiple generics. Thus,
in the multiple entry model, large reverse payments continue to be
payments to delay competition in that sense.
Under the settlement, consumers benefit from multiple generic
competitors for a time period of length
. Under litigation
consumers benefit from multiple generic competitors for an expected time
period of
. The settlement reduces the expected amount of
time during which consumers benefit from multiple generic competitors if
and only if
. This can be written as
.

(2)

Suppose we observe a settlement with a reverse payment in excess of
the Brand’s litigation costs,
. Using inequality (1) above, this
implies
(3)
If
, then
satisfied. Alternatively if

which implies that inequality (2) is
, then we can rewrite inequality (3) as
, where all of the terms in this

expression are positive. This in turn can be rewritten as

.
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The right-hand side is greater than unity. Therefore we must have
, which is exactly inequality (2) that we were seeking to
show. Therefore, we have established:
Proposition #2: Any settlement with a reverse payment in excess of
Brand’s litigation costs must restrict competition in the sense of reducing
the expected period of time during which consumers benefit from
competition by multiple generic entrants.
Allowing Larger Reverse Payments Harms Consumers and Total
Welfare
Above we showed in this model that Brand would not make payments
in excess of its litigation costs other than to limit competition from
multiple generics. Here we study the effect of payment size upon
consumer welfare. In particular, we show that consumers are harmed if
we raise the size of the allowable reverse payment above CB.
Let
be the maximum reverse payment that does not trigger the
Actavis Inference. Our monopoly to duopoly model suggested that
should be set at the level of Brand’s litigation cost,
. This also is what
Justice Breyer concluded in the Actavis decision.
We use the concept of monotonic bargaining from Edlin and
Reichelstein (1996).112 Monotonic bargaining means that if the
bargaining space increases, neither party winds up with less profit under
the bargaining outcome. We now prove:
Proposition #3: If settlement bargaining between Brand and Generic
is efficient and monotonic, and if the legal rule
leads to entry
before T, then consumer welfare and total welfare will both be lower for
any legal rule
that relaxes the Actavis Inference than for the
rule
.
Proof. An increase in
above CB increases the set of feasible
settlements, so with monotonic bargaining, neither party can end up with
lower profit than they would if
.

112. Aaron Edlin & Stefan Reichelstein, Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and
Optimal Investment, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 478, 482 (1996) (defining a bargaining sharing rule
as monotonic if “the payoff each party receives from bargaining is (weakly) increasing in the
size of the renegotiation surplus”). In the context of this paper, the legal rule defines a profit
possibility frontier and space of firm profits that weakly exceed firm profits under litigation.
An increase in Xmax enlarges this bargaining space.
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Let
be the entry date and reverse payment that Brand and
Generic settle on under the legal rule
, and assume that
. Efficient bargaining and
imply that
. (Absent the
legal constraint on payment size, the Brand would trade a higher
payment for an agreement to delay beyond
that together increased
both parties’ profits.)
We will compare the settlement
with the settlement induced
by any relaxed legal rule
. Let
denote the entry date
they settle on given this relaxed rule. We now show that
. If
, then
, since
. Alternatively, if
, then
efficient bargaining implies that the reverse payment will equal the
maximum
. Given that
, the Brand requires some
to
achieve the same profit as it achieves under the settlement
. If
bargaining is weakly monotonic, then
, because the Brand
cannot get less profit under the relaxed antitrust rule
than it
did under the more stringent rule
.
Observe that consumer surplus is a decreasing function of E, since
and

. Therefore, the later entry date
under the relaxed rule
reduces consumer surplus below the level achieved when
. Later entry also reduces total welfare, since total welfare is
lower under monopoly than free entry. Q.E.D.
Proposition #3 tells us that as
increases, the parties move out
the Ray of Delay (now possibly a wobbly curve) until
, at which
point they bump into the constraint from patent law that prohibits
licensing restrictions that extend beyond the lifetime of the patent. For
large enough values of
, the negotiated settlement involves delay by
Generic until T and further increases in
will not affect the
equilibrium outcome.
Proposition #3 also tells us that settlements that we would observe
with
injure consumers relative to Benchmark #2, the alternative
settlement benchmark. In particular, consider any equilibrium
settlement
with
. Such a settlement would only emerge
under a relaxed rule, i.e., on the parties’ belief that
. The
settlement that would be chosen instead given the legal rule
has higher consumer and total welfare than
according to
Proposition #3.
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Large Payments Imply Lower Consumer Welfare than Litigation
Proposition #2 does not guarantee that a settlement with
has
lower consumer welfare compared to litigation. In theory, there exist
settlements with
that have higher consumer welfare compared to
litigation.
The source of this theoretical possibility is the extra component of
Brand’s benefit from settlement discussed above,
. As a
consequence, if Brand has no bargaining power, it is willing to accept a
settlement date
to capture that benefit. In particular, if
,
Brand prefers settlement if and only if

.

As for consumers, later entry lowers consumer welfare. Consumers
require earlier entry, compared to the monopoly-duopoly case, to be
indifferent between settlement and litigation. In particular, consumers
prefer settlement if and only if

.

The question thus arises: do there exist settlements with
that
are preferred by both Brand and consumers to litigation? Such
settlements cannot exist if the earliest entry date that Brand prefer to
litigation would make consumers worse off than litigation. Using the two
expressions derived just above, we have shown:
Proposition #4a: Any settlement with
that is acceptable to
Brand will reduce consumer welfare relative to litigation, provided that
.
Both of these ratios are less than unity. The left-hand side measures
how valuable is duopoly relative to monopoly for Brand, above Brand’s
free-entry profits. The right-hand side measures how valuable free entry
is to consumers compared with duopoly, relative to its value compared to
monopoly.
This condition is likely satisfied in practice. A rough estimate can be
made using data from a recent FTC study, which evaluated the effect of
AGs on drug maker revenues.113 The FTC used wholesale expenditures as
a proxy for Brand and Generic revenues. 114 The FTC estimated relative
revenue during duopoly and free entry, compared to monopoly, for a large
set of drugs experiencing generic entry. On average, Brand retains an
113. See generally FTC, AUTHORIZED GENERIC DRUGS: SHORT-TERM EFFECTS AND
LONG-TERM IMPACT (2011).
114. Id. at 5. The proxy is imperfect because all figures include a wholesaler margin.
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estimated 52% of pre-entry revenue during duopoly.115 This means that
the left-hand side must be less than 0.52.116
Wholesale expenditures can also be used to construct an estimate of
the welfare increase in duopoly and free entry compared to monopoly.
The main source of increased welfare is reduced outlay for drugs. Based
on FTC figures, during duopoly, purchasers save 14% of the pre-entry
price.117 In free entry, purchasers save at least 53%. 118 Under the
assumption that quantities are unchanged, and hence the reduced outlay
exactly captures the welfare increase, 119 the right-hand side is at least
(53% – 14%)/53% = 0.74, and the inequality is satisfied.
These calculations are conservative in two further respects. First,
they assume that Brand launches an AG during Generic’s exclusivity—
i.e., that the “duopoly” period includes an AG, in addition to the branded
product and independent generic. If Brand agrees to a settlement with a
no-AG provision during the 180 days, the inequality widens because
and
both fall. Second, the FTC figures assume that Brand receives
all of the revenue and profit from the AG. 120 If Brand receives only part,
then
falls, again widening the inequality. 121 Finally, we note that if
Brand has significant bargaining power then it will be able to bargain for
later entry that hurts consumers more.

115. Id. at 108 (reporting Brand relative wholesale expenditure of 0.52 during
exclusivity). All estimates are with an AG, unweighted and (where relevant) with full
controls.
116. The bound of 0.52 would be achieved if Brands profits under free entry were
zero and if Brand profit margin under monopoly and duopoly were equivalent.
117. As noted above, Brand’s relative wholesale expenditure during duopoly is 0.52.
The corresponding Generic figure is 0.34. See id. at 59 tbl.3–7 (reporting 0.70 without AG,
and a 52.0% reduction with an AG; 0.70 * (1 – 0.520) = 0.34). The resulting savings is 1.00 –
0.52 – 0.34 = 0.14.
118. Brand’s relative wholesale expenditure during free entry is 0.17. Id. at 108. The
corresponding Generic figure is 0.15. See id. at 106 tbl.6–4 (reporting 0.31 without AG, and
a 52.5% reduction with an AG; 0.31 * (1 – 0.525) = 0.15). The share of later entrants is not
separately reported by the FTC, but inspection of an accompanying graph reporting
contemporaneous shares demonstrates that their combined share is smaller than Generic’s
share. See id. 104 fig.6–3 (reporting later entrants’ combined share to be smaller than
Generic in every period). The resulting savings is at least 1.00 – 0.17 – 0.15 – 0.15 = 0.53.
119. This assumption is conservative, to the extent that quantities would be
expected to increase as prices fall. This assumption overstates the right-hand side to the
extent that a post-entry cessation of Brand marketing puts downward pressure on quantity.
120. Id. at 61 n.52 (“Here, all AGs are treated as if they are marketed by a
subsidiary of the brand-name company.”).
121. To be more precise, a decrease in DB lowers our upper bound on the left hand
side of the inequality.
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WITH MULTIPLE GENERIC ENTRANTS: DURABLE

DUOPOLY
In this section we present and analyze our durable duopoly model of
multiple generic entry, in which we assume that no additional generic
entry occurs following a settlement, even after the first generic entrant’s
180-day exclusivity period ends. Duopoly is therefore significantly more
durable in the case of settlement than in the 180-day duopoly model
above. This is the assumption made by KWGT. None of the drugs
discussed in Part IV fit this pattern. Nevertheless, this pattern is
plausible under the right conditions, and could occur if subsequent
generics do not find it profitable to enter given that they can be sued for
patent infringement and will never enjoy any period of exclusivity.
However, as noted above, in practice in most cases multiple generic entry
does occur after the 180-day exclusivity period granted to the settling
generic ends.
Table 2 gives the expected time spent in monopoly, duopoly, and free
entry during the patent period under litigation and under the settlement
in the durable duopoly model.
Table 2:Durable
Duopoly Model
Monopoly
Duopoly
Free entry

Expected Period of Time
Litigation
PT
(1 – P) H
T – PT – (1 – P)H =
(1 – P)(T – H)

Settlement
E
T–E
0

Joint Profits from Eliminating Competition
Now there is an additional benefit to Brand and Generic associated
with settlement, since settling prevents free entry from occurring prior to
the expiration of the patent. This implies that Proposition #1 also holds
in the model with durable duopoly following settlement.
Brand Payoff from Settlement vs. Litigation
Brand’s payoff from settling on terms

[E, X ]

is

now

EM B + (T - E)DB - X . This is the payoff in the previous model plus the
amount (T - E - H)(DB - FB ) . This extra amount represents the
difference between duopoly and free entry following generic entry at E
and the exclusivity period of length H. Brand’s expected payoff from
litigating is

PTM B + (1- P)[HDB + (T - H)FB ]- CB ,

just as in the
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previous model. Therefore, there is an additional value of settling in this
model equal to

(T - E - H)(DB - FB ) . Adding this term to the value of

settling, settlement on terms [E, X ] implies that

(E - PT )( M B - FB ) + PH(DB - FB ) + (T - E - H)(DB - FB ) > X - CB .

The three terms of the left-hand side reflect the benefits to Brand
from the settlement. The first two terms are the same as above. The third
term is an additional anticompetitive effect of the settlement that accrues
to Brand.

Comparison with Monopoly to Duopoly Model
Now the prospect of multiple generic entry increases the benefits of a
settlement that delays entry, for the two reasons described above plus a
new reason. The new reason is represented by the final term of the righthand side of the inequality above. As just noted, this term represents the
difference between duopoly and free entry following generic entry at E
and the exclusivity period of length H.
Actavis Inference with Multiple Generic Entrants
If settlement precludes entry by additional generics until the patent
expires, it follows immediately that settlement reduces the expected
period of time when consumers benefit from multiple generic competitors.
Therefore, the analog to Proposition #2 is immediate.
Allowing Larger Reverse Payments Harms Consumers and Total
Welfare
The proof of Proposition #3 applies equally in the model where
duopoly is durable following settlement but not following litigation. All
that we needed was that consumer surplus and total welfare decline with
E.
Large Payments Imply Lower Consumer Welfare than Litigation
The analogue to Proposition #4a in the durable duopoly model
follows:
Proposition #4b: In the durable duopoly model, any settlement with
that is acceptable to Brand will reduce consumer welfare relative
to litigation, provided that
.
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In contrast to Proposition #4a, either of these ratios may exceed
unity. As before, the condition is likely satisfied in practice. A rough
estimate can be made using the same method, assumptions, and FTC
data discussed above. The right-hand side is at least (53% – 14%)/14% =
2.79.122 The left-hand side is less than 52%/(100% – 52%) = 1.08,123 and
thus the inequality is satisfied by a comfortable margin. Once again,
these calculations are conservative in the respects discussed above.
BARGAINING POWER, BARGAINING RANGE AND THE ACTAVIS INFERENCE
Antitrust defendants would prefer a world in which antitrust
violations from reverse payment settlements are per se legal so long as
the settlements permit entry after T. Actavis made clear, however, that
pay for delay is illegal and so the question becomes when it is reasonable
to infer that a reverse payment settlement involves pay to avoid or delay
competition not just payment to avoid litigation cost.
Here, we explore the relationship between the bargaining range,
bargaining strength and reductions in competition.
We begin with the simple Monopoly-Duopoly framework of our
Activating Actavis paper and move on to consider the multiple entrant
models introduced above.
Monopoly-Duopoly Model
Consider the monopoly-duopoly model of Activating Actavis. Let
be the entry date that makes Brand indifferent between litigation
and settlement with payment X. For simplicity, we will usually suppress
the argument X and just write
.
The expected length of monopoly and duopoly periods for settlement
E and for litigation in the monopoly-duopoly model are given in Table 3
below.
Table 3: MonopolyDuopoly Model

Expected Period of Time
Litigation

Settlement

Monopoly
Duopoly

122. As before, this lower bound assumes constant quantities across the three states.
Accounting for quantity changes could make the right hand side significantly larger because
the quantity effect could be much larger for the steep price decline from duopoly to free
entry than the more modest one from monopoly to duopoly.
123. Much as before, this calculation assumes simply that the profit margin is lower
for duopoly than for monopoly.
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A settlement shifts time period
from duopoly to monopoly.
Brand pays X and saves
in litigation cost. Thus, Brand is indifferent
between settlement and litigation if
.
If
we see that
. Brand is (just) willing to pay
to
settle with a duopoly period equal in length to the expected duopoly
period under litigation.
Next consider Generic. Let
be the entry date that makes
Generic indifferent between litigation and settlement with payment X. In
the settlement, Generic receives X and saves
in litigation cost. Generic
is willing to accept later entry to receive the payment and save litigation
cost. Generic is indifferent between litigation and settlement if
, or

.

Therefore, in exchange for a payment of

, Generic would be

willing to delay entry by an (expected) length of time equal to

. This

is the (expected) period of time over which duopoly is replaced by
monopoly under a settlement that Generic found indifferent to litigation.
Summarizing, if the reverse payment equals Brand’s litigation cost,
Brand prefers settlement to litigation so long as
, and Generic
prefers settlement to litigation so long as

. So Generic

and Brand bargain over entry dates in the “bargaining range” given by:
.
The greater is Brand’s bargaining power, the later will be the
negotiated entry date, within this range. If Brand has all of the
bargaining power, the negotiated entry date will be

If

Generic has all of the bargaining power, the negotiated entry date will be
This analysis shows that the Actavis Inference is highly favorable to
defendants, in the following specific sense. If Brand has no bargaining
power, the Actavis Inference is perfectly accurate in this model. However,
if Brand has any bargaining power at all, the Actavis Inference will
generate no false antitrust condemnations but will generate some false
antitrust acquittals.

2015]

THE ACTAVIS INFERENCE

633

We can make this statement more precise. Brand’s bargaining power
is defined by k, where the negotiated entry date is given by
. A value of
means that Brand has no bargaining
power and the negotiated entry date is the earliest one that is acceptable
to Brand, namely
which equals
. Likewise, a value of
means
that Brand has all of the bargaining power and the negotiated entry date
is the latest one that is acceptable to Generic, namely
which equals
. If Brand’s bargaining power is k, and if Brand makes a
payment to Generic equal to
by

, then the negotiated entry date is given

.

Proposition #5: If Brand has no bargaining power at all, then the
Actavis Inference is perfectly accurate in identifying anticompetitive
settlements. If Brand has some bargaining power, the Actavis Inference
generates no false condemnations but some false acquittals.
We have not previously emphasized this point in our joint writings,
but the Actavis Inference with a litigation cost benchmark is favorable to
defendants because by design it minimizes false condemnations without
concern for false acquittals. The Actavis Inference is not designed to
catch all payments for delay, only the ones where we are sure that there
is no false condemnation, regardless of Brand’s bargaining power, and we
are sure when
.
This fact should give the courts significant comfort in applying the
Actavis Inference even in cases where defendants try to prove some
possible complication that might (if true) make the Inference
inapplicable. The false acquittals under the Actavis Inference are not a
reason to abandon the Actavis Inference, because doing that would only
lead to settlements that are more anticompetitive, as shown in our
Proposition #3. Instead, the false acquittals might provide a reason to
strengthen the Actavis Inference or to allow proof of delay from other
evidence in cases where the reverse payment is less than litigation costs.
Multiple Generic Entry Models
An analysis parallel to the preceding analysis can be done for the two
multiple generic entry models discussed above. The possibility of multiple
generic entry after litigation (or settlement) moves Brand’s earliest
acceptable entry date
earlier and Generic’s latest acceptable entry
date
later than in the monopoly-duopoly model. Thus, the bargaining
range is larger.
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It continues to be the case, regardless of Brand’s bargaining power,
that settlements with payments in excess of
involve a reduction in
competition from multiple entrants as compared with litigation, as shown
in our Proposition #2, and reduce consumer welfare as shown in
Proposition #3. Hence, the Actavis Inference has no false positives, just
as in the monopoly-duopoly model. Furthermore, it continues to be the
case that when Brand has some bargaining power, settlements, even ones
with payments no larger than
, may involve reductions in competition
and consumer welfare. Unlike the monopoly-duopoly model, even when
Brand has no bargaining power, settlements with payments less than
may involve reductions in competition and consumer welfare.
In equilibrium in the model, false acquittals easily arise, especially if
Brand has significant bargaining power but even if Brand has no
bargaining power. As noted above, this is not a reason to weaken or
abandon the Actavis Inference. If anything, it is a reason to provide
plaintiffs an opportunity to establish that a reverse-payment settlement
is anticompetitive without invoking the Actavis Inference.

APPENDIX B: ERROR-COST ANALYSIS OF ACTAVIS
INFERENCE
The court is attempting to determine whether a challenged reversepayment settlement is or is not anticompetitive. Under the Actavis
Inference, a “large and unexplained” reverse payment serves as a “test
statistic” indicating that the settlement is anticompetitive. As we
explained in Part V, the determination of anticompetitiveness should be
made based on the ex ante information the parties had when they entered
into their agreement, not based on an ex post determination of patent
validity or infringement.
Two types of errors could in principle arise using the Actavis
Inference. A false condemnation (Type I Error) arises if the Actavis
Inference signals that the settlement is anticompetitive when in fact it is
not. A false acquittal (Type II Error) arises if the Actavis Inference does
not signal that the settlement is anticompetitive when in fact it is.
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Error Cost Matrix: Applying the Actavis Inference to
Settlements Involving Reverse Payments
Actavis Inference Applies:
Actavis Inference
Reverse Payment Exceeds Does Not Apply: No
Litigation Costs
Reverse Payment
Exceeding
Litigation Costs
Settlement
Accurate Finding of
Type II Error:
Anticompetitive
Antitrust Liability
False Acquittal
Settlement Not
Type I Error:
Accurate Finding of
Anticompetitive
False Condemnation
No Antitrust
Liability
Propositions #2 and #3 establish that there are no false
condemnations (Type I errors) in our models. Furthermore, as discussed
in the text, the Actavis Inference does generate false acquittals (Type II
errors), especially if Brand has significant bargaining power or if there
are multiple generic entrants. Weakening the Actavis Inference would
generate more false acquittals.
KWGT employ a conception of error costs that conflates patent
adjudication with antitrust adjudication. Their mistake is best illustrated
by the two-by-two “Error Cost Matrix” in the KWGT Working Paper.124
The KWGT rows in that matrix are “Patent Valid” and “Patent Invalid.”
Their columns are “No Antitrust Violation (Scope of the patent test)” and
“Antitrust Violation (Per se illegal).” Their “true” states of the world (the
rows) refer to valid and invalid patents, not procompetitive versus
anticompetitive settlements. Thus, they are not testing the accuracy of
the Actavis Inference in identifying anticompetitive settlements. This
fundamental error is fatal to KWGT’s entire analysis and discussion of
Type I and Type II errors. In particular, KWGT’s mistaken claim that the
Actavis Inference will “increase the costs of Type I errors” is based on
their erroneous conception of what the term “Type I error” means in this
context.

124.

KWGT Working Paper, supra note 10, at 14.

